Yearly Archives: 2013

Open borders is a radical proposal

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After poring through some of the data on the foreign-born proportions in the US during my spare time this past weekend, I came to the conclusion that other than radical open borders advocates and restrictionists, most people don’t really have an idea of just how radical open borders would be. Many pro-immigration people are quick to point to the US’s experience with open borders in the 19th century. But there’s a lot of difference between then and now. On a variety of numerical metrics, the US as it stands today comes fairly close to where it was when borders were most open. This table goes up to 1990, but the 2010 census data puts the total population at 310 million and the foreign-born population at 40 million, so the 1970-1990 trend is geometrically continued in the 1990-2010 period.

  • The foreign-born population as a fraction of the total US population as per the 2010 census is about 13%. This is quite close to the 1910 historical high of about 15%.
  • The foreign-born population in the 1970-2010 period has been roughly doubling every two decades in absolute terms (it went up from about 10 million in 1970 to 20 million in 1990, then again to 40 million in 2010). Compare that to the US’s heyday of open borders: the 19th century. The foreign-born population from 1850 to 1890 grew at a comparable rate: up from 2.2 million in 1850 to 5.6 million in 1870, and then again to 9.2 million in 1890. Note that the Chinese Exclusion Act and related restrictions started kicking in the last quarter of the 19th century. It’s true that the period from 1920 to 1960 saw little growth in the foreign-born population, due to closed borders.

If the foreign-born population in the US continues to grow at roughly the same geometric rate as for the last 40 years, it will be about 55 million in 2020 and about 80 million in 2030. Possibly by 2020 and definitely by 2030, this would mean that the foreign-born share of the population would be well past the 1910 peak.

What would happen under an open borders policy today that mimicked the pre-1875 immigration policy of the United States? I think it’s safe to say that the growth rate will be notably higher than under today’s business as usual scenario. Even people friendly to open borders worry about getting swamped, which is why many propose a gradual opening of the borders. On the upper end of the estimates is David Henderson’s speculation that up to 300 million people could migrate to the United States in the first two years after open borders. But even a moderate view would involve about 10 million people migrating (many of them temporarily) to the United States in the first year following radical open borders. Since the exact smoothing of the flow will depend on the precise policy contours, I’d say that an increase in the foreign-born population of the United States by about 50-100 million in the first decade following open borders (or something close to open borders, such as DRITI) is a fairly conservative, low-end estimate. If you applied the lowest end estimate of this range, 50 million, assuming that the borders opened in 2010, then in 2020, the foreign-born population of the United States would be at about 85-90 million (give or take a few existing foreign-born people dying), which would make the foreign-born proportion in the United States between 20% and 25% — way higher than at any time in US history. If you took the higher end of the (still conservative) estimate of 100 million more foreign-born people in the United States after a decade of open borders starting 2010, that’d be about 135-140 million foreign-born in 2020, out of a total population of somewhere between 400 and 450 million, which would be 30% or more of the population. (Note also that, for comparison, according to polling data on migration, about 135 million people claim they would move to the US in the near future if the US allowed them to do so legally, and this is approximately in line with the above estimates).

[I’m starting 2010 because that’s the last year for which census data is available, though of course one cannot travel back in the past to open the borders].

How does this compare to other countries? Here’s a chart of the foreign-born shares of OECD countries (it’s a few years old, unfortunately). The only countries that have a ~20% or higher population share are Luxembourg, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Luxembourg is extremely small, and is part of the EU, so its anomalously high value may be worth discarding. With the exception of Luxembourg, none of the foreign born shares crosses 25% (though this might have changed since 2006, for which the data was available). Chile’s inclusion in the OECD is misleading for the purposes of this comparison, since its per capita GDP is less than $20,000, so less than half that of the United States. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have extremely low population densities overall. According to Wikipedia’s summary, the US ranks 76th in population density with a density of 34 people/square kilometer. Canada (4 per square kilometer), Australia (3 per square kilometer), and New Zealand (16 per square kilometer) fail to make it to the top 200 in the list. If you exclude all of these, you’re left with basically no country.

But even if you keep Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in, the most ultra-conservative estimate for the foreign-born share in the United States under an open borders type policy is comparable to the highest foreign-born currently seen in the OECD, and more realistic estimates of what would happen in the US under open borders with respect to the foreign-born population place us literally in uncharted territory.

All these data are of course well known to most people in the migration debate. Restrictionists often embrace statistics and factoids of just the sort described here to paint open borders as truly lunatic. And in a sense, they’re right. Open borders is a truly radical, unprecedented proposal. Historical analogies can get us this far, but they simply don’t cut it quantitatively when describing the potential effects (good or bad) of open borders today.

Note that the reason I focused on the United States is simply because I’ve been looking at US-related data in the recent past. However, the case for open borders is universal, so one might wonder if there are other countries for which open borders would be less unprecedented. I don’t know an answer offhand, but it’s also true that many other countries are much smaller (in area and population) compared to the US, so their enacting open borders wouldn’t quite mean the same thing as the US doing so. However, I don’t see how the stats would look less dramatic for most other countries. If Canada announced open borders, then given that the population of Canada is about 1/10 that of the US, a much smaller migrant inflow would have a much larger impact on the foreign born proportion. In fairness, though, it may be argued that since Canada has a much lower population density, some of the overpopulation-related arguments touted by restrictionists have far less force in Canada.

What I think this points to is that when open borders advocates rely on historical precedent regarding open borders, they need to determine the appropriate adjustment factors for a reasonable comparison between the past and present, and justify what these adjustment factors should be. A naive copy-and-paste of population growth rates between the past and present suggests that the current immigration policy of the United States (and possibly of many other countries) already produces results similar to the heyday of open borders. This also raises the question of why we intuitively expect far larger migration flows today, in both absolute and proportional terms, compared to 19th century open borders. Falling transportation and communication costs are the obvious culprits that come to mind, but other technological and social changes might also be involved (for instance, a society that’s far more welcoming of different races and cultures may reduce the perceived and real costs of migrating for people from these different races and cultures — independent of the role of government policy). The next question would be whether all aspects of society have become faster at equal rates, or whether some aspects (people’s ability to physically migrate) have become much faster compared to others (the ability to form new industries and residential areas to accommodate large population influxes), along with the implications of these different degrees of speeding up for the effects of open borders.

Michael Clemens on the “path to citizenship”

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Michael Clemens, who heads the migration-related initiatives at the Center for Global Development, recently wrote a blog post titled Care About Unauthorized Immigration? The ‘Path to Citizenship’ Is What Matters Least. Like my co-blogger Chris, Clemens is critical of overemphasis on the path to citizenship. Clemens:

I am not saying that the status of unauthorized immigrants isn’t important. I’m saying that the policy step of a path-to-citizenship is unlikely to be an important determinant of the unauthorized immigrant population, even in the short term.

This is clear from U.S. history. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan created a path to citizenship for most of the 3 million unauthorized immigrants then living in America when he signed the Simpson-Mazzoli Act. Watch what happened to the unauthorized immigrant population. By 1990, just four years later, you couldn’t even tell that anything had happened: [view graph at original link]

Later in the same post:

If you’re concerned about the phenomenon of unauthorized immigration or the plight of unauthorized immigrants, pay less attention to the path-to-citizenship. Keep one question foremost in your mind as you read the forthcoming details of the Senators’ and president’s proposals: What are they offering U.S. farmers to get the labor they need without going under? What are they offering U.S. parents to get the childcare they need without breaking the bank? These are the provisions that will shape unauthorized immigration for tomorrow’s America.

My thoughts:

  • From a pro-open borders perspective, the path to citizenship is the least important of all issues being discussed.
  • From the political externalities perspective, the path to citizenship is very very important.
  • I think that while Clemens is correct that citizenship or the lack of it is not much of an incentive to migrate, the data offered by Clemens don’t quite support that conclusion. The graph displayed by Clemens does suggest that a path to citizenship will not reduce future unauthorized immigration. I’m not exactly sure who argues this, though it does seem like the sort of thing that somebody who hasn’t thought clearly about the issue might say. But restrictionists usually argue the opposite — that a path to citizenship for past unauthorized immigrants will incentivize increases in future unauthorized immigration. This, I suspect, is true. Clemens’ graph doesn’t extend much before 1986, but it’s easy to see that the rate of increase must have been slower before 1986, because the total number of unauthorized immigrants couldn’t have been negative. So, it does seem like the 1986 immigration reform incentivized future unauthorized immigration. What’s not clear, though, is whether citizenship specifically had that effect over and above being granted legal status. So overall, the marginal effect of citizenship seems to be unclear.
  • Even if a path to citizenship is not important for migrants or for open borders advocates, it’s very important for political parties, who are after all negotiating with their political competitors about future voters — the people who’ll decide the parties’ future fate. I don’t see eye to eye with Peter Brimelow, but he’s right that granting citizenship to migrants is about electing a new people, and political parties have a self-interest in electing people who’ll elect them. This doesn’t mean they’d always follow that self-interest — there might be other pragmatic and ethical considerations — but the issue will weigh heavily in negotiations. BK pointed out in the comments that even pro-immigration Republicans don’t expect large numbers of newly minted immigrant citizens to vote for the Republicans, hence they are more likely to support guest worker programs. Democrats do seem to have an advantage with migrant votes, and hence support a path to citizenship, but supporting guest worker programs may cost them union support, which might make them reluctant to do so, as Alex Nowrasteh pointed out:

    So why doesn’t the proposed immigration reform include a comprehensive guest-worker program? Surprisingly, the main issue is not opposition from conservative Republicans. It is unions and their supporters who do not want it.

    In the 2007 immigration reform push, an amendment that would have ended the guest-worker program after five years destroyed Republican support.

    The then-leaders of the AFL-CIO, the Laborers’ International Union of North America, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, the Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers and the Teamsters all wrote letters opposing guest workers and supporting the amendment.

18 years of immigration torment

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 Atanas Entchev is an immigrant to the US who is currently penning a book about what he calls “[his] family’s 18-year US immigration ordeal.” He is currently blogging excerpts from the book. Atanas’s story is a poignant reminder of the harshness of immigration restrictions and the climate of fear they create. Atanas is a recognised leader in his field of geospatial studies, one of his clients being the US government. He was legally present in the US for most of the last 20 years — but because of a legal snafu in 2011, he became eligible for deportation. He and his son were arrested and held in custody for over 2 months, facing deportation proceedings.

The Free Atanas campaign published a fairly comprehensive (if obviously sympathetic) summary of why his family was facing deportation, and why they were seeking prosecutorial discretion. Atanas and his son were detained in the autumn of 2011, making them one of millions of victims of the Obama administration’s heavyhanded immigration crackdown. Obama purports to have targeted threats to public safety and prioritised them for deportation, but as far as one can tell, there is no real reason why Atanas and his family were prioritised.

After a campaign mounted by people who knew Atanas both personally and professionally, he and his son were freed at the government’s discretion, with permission to remain for 1 year. Information on why the government did this is scarce, though it probably helped that a Congressman and Senator signed on to the petition for Atanas’s release.

I’ve written before about the absurdities of immigration enforcement, and Atanas’s case is a perfect addition to the list. Atanas and his family lived legally in the US for 2 decades. He so thoroughly integrated his family into the US that his son, despite holding Bulgarian citizenship, speaks no Bulgarian. He became eligible for deportation because his lawyer made a mistake, and immigration law offered him no way to correct that mistake. Then he was prioritised for deportation for reasons unknown, detained, and then released, also for opaque reasons. What way is this for government to make decisions that literally turn people’s lives upside down?

Atanas is currently seeking a literary agent to help him get his book published. It looks like he’s been slow to release much on his blog, so I hope he gets around to publishing. It looks like it’ll be something worth reading.

Auctions, tariffs, and taxes

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A draft that Alex Nowrasteh sent me to read provoked me to think in a new way about various market alternatives for regulating immigration. All of the following policies use the price mechanism, in one way or another, to ration visas by willingness-to-pay, while capturing some of the surpluses generated by immigration to return them to natives.

1. Auctions. Under this mechanism, a certain number of visas would be sold to the highest bidder. There’s a lot to be said about auction design, but for concreteness, you could just let everyone submit a bid, and then accept the top x bids, requiring them each to pay, not what they bid (which would make them bid strategically) but the lowest acceptable bid (which would make them reveal their true values). Auction winners would pay their bid, and be issued visas.

2. Tariffs. Under this mechanism, the government would set a price for a visa, and whoever was willing to pay it would receive one. There might, of course, be restrictions: knowledge of English, perhaps, or criminal background check, or some regions of the world (Pakistan?) might be excluded or treated differently on national security grounds.

3. Taxes. This is the approach I’ve long advocated: the DRITI scheme would be one way to design it. In this case, to come would be nearly free– in the DRITI scheme, I have people preimburse the government for a deportation option which they could then exercise if they were destitute and wanted to go home– but those who came to work would pay a surtax (DRITI has some other features but never mind those for now).

Now, at a highly theoretical level, the effects of all these policies could be much the same. It is not the case that, say, auctions are necessarily more restrictive than tariffs, and tariffs than taxes. If you auctioned off enough visas, that could be quite a loose immigration policy. If you set a tariff, or a migrant surtax, very high, the policy could be rather restrictive. If the government knows its own preferences and the demand curve for immigration, it doesn’t matter whether it controls the quantity (via auctions) or the price (via tariffs/taxes): the number who will come, and what they will pay, will maximize the government’s objective function. Similarly, if immigrants know what they’ll earn and are not credit-constrained, it doesn’t matter whether they pay everything up front (via auctions/tariffs) or over time (via taxes): either way, those will come whose net present value of migrating is greater than the net present value of the payments required.

There are a lot of practical differences between the three policies but I think the crucial one is how the burden of uncertainty is distributed, if, as is realistic, the government does not know exactly what the demand for immigration is like, nor do immigrants know exactly what they’ll earn in the US.

Under the auction mechanism, the government faces no uncertainty about what may the most important variable, namely, how many immigrants will come, though it faces uncertainty about how much it will raise from the auction. Immigrants, on the other hand, face a lot of uncertainty, because they don’t know if their bids will prove sufficiently high to qualify for visas. Immigrants might find it difficult to plan, not knowing whether they would be able to come or not. Also, they wouldn’t know how much they would end up paying. If an immigrant bids $500,000, he might be fairly confident of coming, but not know whether he’d end up paying $20,000 or $100,000.

Under the tariff mechanism, the government faces uncertainty about how many immigrants will come, and also about how much revenue it will receive in total, but not about what price each immigrant will pay. It knows how much revenue it will get per immigrant. Meanwhile, immigrants know what they’ll have to pay for a visa, and face no uncertainty on that front. But they face a lot of uncertainty about what they’ll earn in the US, and how much they’ll like it there. The value of immigrating is probably quite uncertain, but they have to pay the same price in any case. If they pay a lot, then are unlucky in the labor market, or have overestimated their value, or become unbearably homesick, they’re in trouble. Of course, they might also get large, unexpected surpluses if their fortunes in the US are better than they had anticipated. But it’s a risky undertaking.

Under the tax mechanism, the government faces uncertainty, both about how many immigrants will come, and about how much the immigrants will earn and therefore how much they’ll pay in taxes. The government, moreover, has to wait to get paid. Immigrants, on the other hand, face much less risk. They don’t know how well they’ll succeed in the US, but if they do badly, they can go home, or if they stay even though they’re earning little, they’ll pay little (though even a small amount might be painful) for the privilege of staying. If they do well, they’ll pay a lot, but they can afford it then. If they earn well enough but dislike life in the US, they’re not bound to stay just so they can pay off the debt they incurred for the visa: the visa was near-free. Immigrants also don’t need to have a lot of liquid assets to come.

I much prefer the tax mechanism, because the government can handle the risk easily. The government is highly “diversified” in that many immigrants will come, and more taxes from the successful will offset fewer taxes from the less successful. And the government can easily afford to wait and garnish wages rather than getting a lump sum up front. I think only the tax mechanism would (virtually) eliminate undocumented immigration, because anyone who could afford to pay a coyote could afford to get a visa. I also think the government could raise the most money through immigration taxes, because immigrants who were relieved of risk and the need to go into debt would be willing to accept arrangements that, on average, would ultimately cost them a good deal more than what they would have agreed to pay as a lump sum ex ante.

But it occurs to me (or perhaps Vipul suggested it, I can’t remember) that a policy path to open borders might involve (a) auctions first, (b) then tariffs, and (c) taxes last.

If the public appreciated the efficiency advantages of regulating immigration by working through markets, but was still spooked by the possibility of getting swamped, they might go for the auction approach. That way they’d still control how many immigrants came in.

If the auction mechanism had been in place for a while, people might start to feel they knew something about the shape of the immigration demand curve, which would make them more comfortable with the idea of tariffs, since the number of immigrants who would use them, though unknown, would be less unknown. People could make an educated guess. Moreover, the auction mechanism would have some problems which a tariff could resolve. For example, what’s the auction schedule? If it were annual, people would have to wait a long time for it, and to lose a bid could mean the disruption of a lot of big plans. If it were monthly, people would speculate on a favorable month. Prices might fluctuate in strange ways. Some might be willing to pay a lot more than the usual auction prices during the off-season, while others would overbid and regret it. A tariff would promise to be less arbitrary and raise more revenue.

Later, when the tariff mechanism had been in place for a while, people would have a clearer idea what the income profile of immigrants tended to be, which would help them project the earnings of a migration tax. There would be lots of stories about spirited, entrepreneurial aspirants to immigration who, however, couldn’t raise the money to come, though they seemed sure to succeed in the US if they could just get over that hurdle. Others would pay the tariff, get homesick, but be stuck, needing high earnings to pay off creditors. A switch to taxes would promise to relieve immigrants of risk and avoid excluding promising people merely because they had poor access to credit, while at the same time, increasing the revenue the government could take in.

The Case of Detroit

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Between 1900 and 1950, the population of Detroit increased more than six times over. But this understates how radical the growth really was at its peak—between 1900 and 1930, the population grew by 4.5 times. In the decade between 1910 and 1920 alone, the population grew by nearly 115 percent.

A lot of this population increase was due to inflows from other regions of the United States, but no small fraction of it can be attributed to foreign born immigrants. In Wayne County, where Detroit is located, the foreign born population increased by about 326% between 1900 and 1930. If our current foreign born population increased by a similar proportion, it would add another 130 million to their numbers.

And it’s not as though the native-born Americans who migrated there were cut from the same demographic cloth as the Detroit residents of 1900. African Americans from the south, for example, migrated to Detroit by the tens of thousands during that time period.

Moreover, the migrants to Detroit were overwhelmingly competing for very similar factory jobs–foreign in origin or not, the straightforward supply analysis of immigration restrictionists would suggest that wages for these jobs should have plummeted due to all the new arrivals. After all, the people who were there in 1910 had to compete against a labor market that was more than twice as large a decade later! To say nothing of the people who were there in 1900 and in three decades had to compete in a labor market that was more than four times as large as the one they started in!

But this is exactly the opposite of what occurred. It was precisely during this time period that the median wage of low-skilled workers in Detroit was exploding, rather than falling. The reason was largely the auto manufacturing revolution, an economic phenomena that owed quite a lot to one son of an immigrant. The innovation in manufacturing drew over a million people to Detroit like a magnet, and still a huge portion of the benefits of the innovation ended up with the average worker, even with the dramatic expansion in the supply of their competitors.

If we had gone back in time and closed America’s borders prior to 1900, hundreds of thousands of the people who helped make the Detroit boom happen would never have come. And if we applied the same restrictionist logic to Wayne County and limited the inflows from the rest of the country, far from helping out Detroit’s residents, the city would have played no part in the auto manufacturing revolution whatsoever; it would have gone to another, less restrictive city.

Immigration inflows are not random. They are likely to occur where the labor is most highly valued–and the increase in scale can have dynamic effects beyond simple supply and demand analysis. In Detroit, it made an entirely new industry possible.

So what can we learn from this specific episode in one city’s history? In my next post, I will discuss that very question.