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Krugman and Cowen on immigration; or, rallying the economic profession around open borders

Co-blogger Joel Newman recently authored a fine post calling out Paul Krugman on his seeming endorsement of unjust immigration laws. Joel notes that Krugman eagerly endorsed excessively restrictive immigration laws introduced in the US in 1924, without even mentioning or criticising their basis in primarily racist and empirically-unfounded bigotry. Krugman essentially endorsed closing the borders because, in his own words,

The New Deal made America a vastly better place, yet it probably wouldn’t have been possible without the immigration restrictions that went into effect after World War I. For one thing, absent those restrictions, there would have been many claims, justified or not, about people flocking to America to take advantage of welfare programs.

Furthermore, open immigration meant that many of America’s worst-paid workers weren’t citizens and couldn’t vote. Once immigration restrictions were in place, and immigrants already here gained citizenship, this disenfranchised class at the bottom shrank rapidly, helping to create the political conditions for a stronger social safety net. And, yes, low-skill immigration probably has some depressing effect on wages, although the available evidence suggests that the effect is quite small.

The chief problem with this argument is Krugman’s implicit assumption that it would have been impossible — whether for fairness or politically practicable reasons — to design a welfare system that excludes non-citizens. Limitations on benefits access for non-citizens are what we call keyhole solutions, policies aimed at solving a particular problem by targeting it in a keyhole fashion — using a swatter instead of a nuclear bomb to kill a fly.

We know Krugman’s assumption of unworkability is unjustified because  many welfare systems, including that of the US, already exclude immigrants from most benefits. Don’t take it from me; take it from the federal government. If you need a one-sentence summary, here it is:

With some exceptions, “Qualified Aliens” entering the country after August 22, 1996, are denied “Federal means-tested public benefits” for their first five years in the U.S. as qualified aliens.

“Qualified Aliens” basically refers to what we colloquially might call “legal immigrants”. Unauthorised immigrants never qualify for federal benefits unless and until they become legal immigrants and pass the five-year waiting period.

What of universal, non-means-tested benefits, like Social Security, which is often seen the crowning jewel of the New Deal? Or of Medicare, the crowning jewel of Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” follow-up to the New Deal? Well, anyone half-familiar with the economics of these laws knows the answer: citizen or not, virtually nobody can qualify to receive benefits from either of these programmes without working for at least 10 years (see this report from the conservative Heritage Foundation for more). You would never see a flood of immigrants bringing their aged and infirm to cash in on American universal social benefits, because unless these aged and infirm worked for a decade, they would never qualify.

Are these limitations on immigrant welfare access immoral, or politically infeasible? That doesn’t seem to be the case to me. Obviously they are politically feasible; if anything, it would have been quite politically impossible to enact some of these programmes without such restrictions! And although every government decision is fraught with moral trade-offs, it seems more immoral to deny anyone, native or foreign, the right to go where they please in peace than it would be to allow them liberty of work and travel at the expense of higher bars for them to access state funds for the indigent. I tend to think Krugman would agree; to my knowledge he has never criticised bars on immigrant access to welfare as fundamentally unjust — while he has routinely deplored in the past efforts to deprive foreigners of jobs and opportunities that they can and want to seize.

Krugman is certainly a terribly smart economist, so I believe he understands all these issues I raise, possibly much better than I do. That’s why his wording is so careful. He says that “absent [immigration] restrictions, there would have been many claims, justified or not, about people flocking to America to take advantage of welfare programs.” (emphasis added) He never says these claims would have been justified or valid, but he also never calls them out as clearly unjustified and invalid either, even though such assertions clearly would have been completely baseless by design in the very New Deal that the US got!

It is quite uncharacteristic of Krugman to essentially surrender to bigotry and ignorance in a policy debate. He is basically saying: “A bunch of stupid bigots would have made some false claims about a good policy if we didn’t forcefully exclude immigrants from our shores, so it’s a good thing we catered to these bigots’ unfounded prejudices.” The Krugman I’ve been reading for almost a decade would never have said anything close to this — except, alas, on immigration.

I don’t think Krugman needs to be persuaded of the economic feasibility of keyhole solutions like benefit access limitations. After all, he links to this fantastic review of the economic literature on immigration, which finds that thanks in no small part to the limitations on welfare access which virtually every country has enacted, the average immigrant to the developed world is a fiscal breakeven. Immigrants don’t tax social welfare systems anywhere as much as the typical non-economist might expect, because social welfare systems are perfectly capable of serving citizens while limiting immigrants’ access.

It is very unlike Krugman to notice such a gaping economic fallacy, and refrain from exploiting or belittling it. The only explanation I can see of the issue is that, like most centre-left moderates on immigration, he has fallen prey to a series of mistakes leading him to underrate the importance of the issue. I can only hope that Krugman eventually listens to reason — that he listens to himself.

Just look at Paul Krugman discussing the topic of domestic migration — now here is the Krugman I know, lambasting unfounded economic thinking. Within the US, domestic migrants have mostly moved to “Sunbelt” states like Texas. Their politicians boast of business-friendly policies and low taxes. But, Krugman astutely points out, these policies don’t seem to be showing up in the productivity or wage figures.

From wage data, it seems that migrants to Sunbelt states are actually leaving more productive climes for new homes in a less productive region! Krugman argues the data has to lead us to conclusion that the main reason they move is because they actually take home more money, despite earning less. The cause of this?

Because living there is cheaper, basically because of housing. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, rents (including the equivalent rent involved in buying a house) in metropolitan New York are about 60 percent higher than in Houston, 70 percent higher than in Atlanta.

In other words, what the facts really suggest is that Americans are being pushed out of the Northeast (and, more recently, California) by high housing costs rather than pulled out by superior economic performance in the Sunbelt.

And this, in turn, means that the growth of the Sunbelt isn’t the kind of success story conservatives would have us believe. Yes, Americans are moving to places like Texas, but, in a fundamental sense, they’re moving the wrong way, leaving local economies where their productivity is high for destinations where it’s lower. And the way to make the country richer is to encourage them to move back.

Migration is an extremely important issue because it is the primary way that our societies make better use of scarce human talent. A mind is a terrible thing to waste — so it would be particularly sad if the innovator behind the next Facebook or Tesla was forced to live in the boondocks because he or she just couldn’t live where all the other innovators are, because of laws designed to exclude people like him or her from the places where those innovators live.

But the same logic applies to less-skilled workers too: if we need more housing and services for smart people who want to live in cities like New York, Chicago, or San Francisco, then we also need more construction workers and bus drivers and baristas and barbers. You can’t have a city that’s purely populated by high-skilled workers; it would be inefficient if every barista in town had a PhD. So it would be just as much of a shame if baristas with just a high school education couldn’t live in New York, Chicago, or San Francisco.

Again, I don’t need to explain any of this to Krugman. He clearly gets it. But he strangely ignores the importance of this productivity problem when it comes to international immigration. All he needs to do is listen to himself, and apply the identical productivity insights to movement across international borders.

The wage gaps Krugman talks about are, as he says, a measure of inefficiency and impoverishment: that people are forced to work in less productive jobs, earning lower wages, ultimately impoverishes everyone. People’s talents, whatever they may be, are not being put to their fullest use. But the immigration restrictions Krugman supports have exactly the same effect as the strict land use laws he laments.

And although the effects are conceptually the same, the magnitudes are not. The wage gaps Krugman discusses are on the order of 10 to 20%. But the wage gaps created by restrictions on movement across international borders are on the order of 100 to 1400%! These wage gaps are immense, and they have never existed in regions with unified labour markets, where workers are legally allowed to move across borders and work.

See the seminal economic paper by Michael Clemens, Lant Pritchett, and Claudio Montenegro for more — but trust me, the effects are huge. No matter what assumptions or methods they use, economists studying the issue virtually always conclude that the inefficiencies resulting from our laws restricting the movement of workers between countries are on the order of 50 to 150% of world GDP: trillions of dollars. Simply put, they dwarf the problems Krugman complains about when it comes to the inefficiences created by policies that drive people to migrate from Massachusetts to Texas.

Don’t get me wrong: I completely agree with Krugman that strict land use laws, which aim to prevent the “wrong” types of people from being able to live in certain areas, are inefficient and reprehensible. I applaud him all the more for drawing attention to them. Unconscionably strict land use policies are deeply-entrenched in American law; so deep that Krugman’s fellow pro-immigration economist and New York Times columnist, libertarian Tyler Cowen, has declared he cannot support open borders because it would not be politically feasible to let so many poor people live in rich countries — because the only way to truly allow poor people to come would be to repeal and overcome the strict land use regime prevailing in much of America.

The parallels actually are quite striking; both Krugman and Cowen neglect to think of, or at least discuss, how keyhole solution-type policies could ameliorate the political costs of immigration that they worry about. After all, as Krugman himself has observed, immigrants gain immensely from being able to put their labour to more productive uses, in more productive regions.

They would be willing to pay a lot for the ability to live and work legally in a country like the US; that’s why they shell out thousands in fees to smugglers when the law, unjustly and inefficiently, bans them from coming legally. It would be far fairer and efficient to let immigrants compensate their new neighbours for the costs (even if these might be purely psychic costs incurred by those with anti-immigration prejudices) of living near immigrants. Both Krugman and Cowen know this — and even if it doesn’t fully comport with their sense of propriety, it is surely fairer to give immigrants some choice in the question of how to appease these bigots with political power, rather than to just ban most immigrants from coming altogether.

Both co-blogger economist Nathan Smith and myself have politely criticised Cowen before for his odd and inconsistent thinking about immigration, so I suppose it’s only fair that we hold Krugman to the same bar. And I can think of no better articulation of that bar than Cowen’s own, in one of his New York Times columns:

Often, economists spend their energies squabbling with one another, but arguably the more important contrast is between our broadly liberal economic worldview and the various alternatives — common around the globe — that postulate natural hierarchies of religion, ethnicity, caste and gender, often enforced by law and strict custom…

One enormous issue is international migration. A distressingly large portion of the debate in many countries analyzes the effects of higher immigration on domestic citizens alone and seeks to restrict immigration to protect a national culture or existing economic interests. The obvious but too-often-underemphasized reality is that immigration is a significant gain for most people who move to a new country.

Michael Clemens, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, quantified these gains in a 2011 paper, “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?” He found that unrestricted immigration could create tens of trillions of dollars in economic value, as captured by the migrants themselves in the form of higher wages in their new countries and by those who hire the migrants or consume the products of their labor. For a profession concerned with precision, it is remarkable how infrequently we economists talk about those rather large numbers.

Truly open borders might prove unworkable, especially in countries with welfare states, and kill the goose laying the proverbial golden eggs; in this regard Mr. Clemens’s analysis may require some modification. Still, we should be obsessing over how many of those trillions can actually be realized.

In any case, there is an overriding moral issue. Imagine that it is your professional duty to report a cost-benefit analysis of liberalizing immigration policy. You wouldn’t dream of producing a study that counted “men only” or “whites only,” at least not without specific, clearly stated reasons for dividing the data.

So why report cost-benefit results only for United States citizens or residents, as is sometimes done in analyses of both international trade and migration? The nation-state is a good practical institution, but it does not provide the final moral delineation of which people count and which do not. So commentators on trade and immigration should stress the cosmopolitan perspective, knowing that the practical imperatives of the nation-state will not be underrepresented in the ensuing debate.

Economists have never let bigotry or prejudice get in the way of just and fair economic policies. That’s why Krugman worries so much about cost of living forcing engineers and construction workers to live in Dallas instead of New York: because the arbitrary exclusion of strict housing laws prevents these people from earning the wages they command in a fair market. It’s a problem of both social justice and economic efficiency. That people worry about new neighbours, or tall buildings, is not a good enough reason to arbitrarily exclude these people from living in places where they are willing to pay the market rent to earn their market wage.

After all, such excuses have often been cited in the past to exclude women, Jews, or blacks from the labour and housing markets by the force of law. That’s why, as Cowen observed earlier in his piece, economists were among the loudest and most consistent critics of slavery; the field’s derogatory nickname, “the dismal science“, originates from slavery advocates mocking economists’ at-the-time “absurd” view that blacks be given choice and agency in their work!

This long tradition of fighting for social justice and human prosperity should compel both Krugman and Cowen to seriously weigh the costs our immigration laws impose on the poor of the world, and the drag they impose on the productivity of the human race. Indeed, it should weigh on all economists. The consensus of the profession is that the current immigration regime is inefficient, and that most of the excuses given for maintaining it are unfounded.

Yet when they write about immigration, Krugman and Cowen often tiptoe about this consensus, and seemingly shrink from confronting the poorly-grounded rationales typically proffered in defence of immigration restrictions. It would be a shame for them to shrink from this, when their intellectual ancestors boldly placed themselves on the front lines fighting for social change, knowing that no less than fairness for broad swathes of humanity and prosperity for all humans stood at stake.

And should you doubt that both equity and efficiency are at stake here, I’ll defer to public policy student Daniel Kay Hertz’s words on the matter. He writes of zoning and land use laws, but with one or two modifications, his is just as eloquent a summation of the problem with modern immigration laws:

…the idea [is] that no one has a “right” to live in elite urban centers like San Francisco, and so affordable housing in those places isn’t actually a social justice issue…

But either way, applying this argument in favor of restrictive zoning is pretty ludicrous. After all, the reason that so many people can’t afford San Francisco isn’t because of the impartial workings of the market; it’s because the government is artificially inflating prices. If the government decided to impose supply restrictions on, say, milk, causing prices to go up to $20 a gallon, and people asked the government to stop doing that, it wouldn’t really make any sense to shrug your shoulders and say, “Well, not everyone has the right to drink milk.”

Or, more pointedly, it’s as if you lost a race because someone was holding onto your ankles the entire time, and when you complained they responded, “Well, somebody had to lose.” Yes, of course. But the game was rigged.

Moreover, this kind of argument assumes – without saying so – that residents of wealthy neighborhoods do have another kind of right: the right to expect that their neighborhoods will stay the same forever. They don’t. Nor do they have the right to dictate where or how other people live. There’s surely some legitimate interest in incrementalism, to prevent the perceived chaos of massive and ubiquitous projects in a previously low-rise, quiet area. But that suggests that government should allow steady, even growth, not quash it altogether.

…What about, they say, the huge depopulated areas in Detroit, the South Side of Chicago, Philadelphia, the rest of the Rust Belt, and so on? What’s wrong with pushing people to live in those places?

There is a hint of sense in this – building more houses when we have these houses over there, sitting empty, isn’t ideal – but I don’t think it takes an awful lot of poking before it falls apart. If your plan to bring back economically devastated areas is to force lots of poor people to live there by denying them the option of living somewhere with, say, safe streets and decent schools, then…I’m not really sure what to say. That seems self-evidently like a disaster, both from a practical perspective – exactly what sort of renaissance do we expect to happen if we encourage lots of lower-income people to congregate in places that are already resource-starved, without an escape hatch? Has that ever worked out? – and from a moral one. Not to mention the legal one: remember, again, that the reason these areas are so expensive is because of government interfering in the market. The status quo isn’t neutrality; it’s a massive redistribution program to the wealthy from everyone else.

Zoning and land use laws are a serious problem, whether you look at them from the point of view of equity, or efficiency. But for all the reasons Hertz lays out, so are immigration laws. And the problems at stake with unjust, inefficient immigration laws are far bigger: literally, trillions of dollars bigger.

I first encountered Krugman as a young student in high school. One of my favourite pieces, to this day, is Krugman’s stirring defence of sweatshops. There is nothing noble in paying poor people a pittance for their labour, of course. But as Krugman pointed out, how can it be more noble to forcefully deny poor people even the choice  to be paid this pittance? How can it be right to deny people the chance to earn a wage of any kind, and to force them to live lives of subsistence farming, living literally hand-to-mouth, simply because we feel we have the moral authority to do so?

When he penned pieces like those, Krugman had no qualms calling out uncritical opponents of sweatshops on their bigotry:

The real complaint against developing countries is not that their exports are based on low wages and sweatshops. The complaint is that they export at all. And so the supposed friends of poor workers abroad are no friends at all. If they got their way the result … would not just be no sweatshop–it would be no job.

That’s the Krugman I fell in love with; that’s the Krugman who changed my life, convincing me to major in economics. We need that Krugman again more than ever, to speak out against the injustice and idiocy of immigration restrictions. Let me quote Krugman then to Krugman now:

You may say that the wretched of the earth should not be forced to serve as hewers of wood, drawers of water, and sewers of sneakers for the affluent. But what is the alternative? Should they be helped with foreign aid? Maybe–although the historical record of regions like southern Italy suggests that such aid has a tendency to promote perpetual dependence. Anyway, there isn’t the slightest prospect of significant aid materializing. Should their own governments provide more social justice? Of course–but they won’t, or at least not because we tell them to. And as long as you have no realistic alternative to [immigration], to oppose it means that you are willing to deny desperately poor people the best chance they have of progress for the sake of what amounts to an aesthetic standard…

In short, my correspondents are not entitled to their self-righteousness. They have not thought the matter through. And when the hopes of hundreds of millions are at stake, thinking things through is not just good intellectual practice. It is a moral duty.

Amen, Mr. Krugman. The hopes of millions remain at stake when it comes to immigration laws that unjustly ban them from earning the market wage they could command by moving. Laws that create wage gaps on the order of thousands of percentage points, and productivity losses on the order of trillions of dollars are unconscionable. The fates of billions of poor people hang in the balance. Thinking things through, and speaking economic truth to power, is not just good intellectual practice; it remains our moral duty.

I am grateful to Carl Shulman of the Open Borders Action Group for his comments and suggestions that were incorporated into this piece.

How can migrants afford huge smuggling fees? Three answers

Even in the historical era of near-open borders, migration was not free of cost. But the main costs of international migration were similar to the costs of intranational migration: the cost of transporting one’s person and belongings, and of finding work, lodging, and sustenance at one’s new home. Legal restrictions on migration imposed no financial cost. At some immigration checkpoints, such as Ellis Island, officers turned back migrants who they thought would be unable to sustain themselves, but they did not charge an admission fee (beyond a small fee to cover administrative costs). So migrants simply had to demonstrate that they had enough money to take care of themselves for a few days while they looked for a job, rather than pay a huge fee to the officers.

Today, legal travel costs are quite low. One can get a one-way flight between diametrically opposite corners of the world for well under $2000. This is far from a negligible amount of money for the world’s poorest people, but it’s something that people above the very lowest rungs of poverty could probably access in loans. Particularly given the huge place premium, it seems like people would be quite willing to lend money to finance journeys, and travel costs wouldn’t be a bottleneck. For migrants with more assets back home, moving costs could be greater insofar as they may need to dispose of their assets before moving, but again, this cost is a small proportion of the migrant’s net worth. (Two somewhat related posts of mine: factors that would constrain migration if borders were opened quickly over a short span of time, and selection effects for migrants: some a priori possibilities. The latter discusses the way that moving costs could lead to selection effects for migrants).

At present, however, legal migration is a very difficult option for many people. Those who seek to migrate unlawfully have two options: either enter on a tourist visa or temporary work/study visa and then overstay it, or smuggle oneself in illegally. But temporary work/study visas are pretty hard to get too. Consular officers are quite cautious about granting tourist visas to people who seem like they are trying to use it as a pretext to migrate, and the tourist visa option is also thereby rendered unavailable to many potential migrants (in fact, consular officers have an extraordinary level of discretion here and little accountability to the visa applicants they deny, see my co-blogger John’s posts on the subject here, here, and here). Moreover, coming in on a tourist visa leaves a legal trail for the migrant, making it potentially easier for authorities to track the migrant down. Thus, the incentive for people to cross borders surreptitiously, despite the considerable physical discomfort and danger. In the United States, somewhere between a third and a half of migrants who are not currently in legal status are people who actually crossed the border without authorization.

Boat carrying refugees from Libya and Tunisia

African migrants stranded on a boat coming from Libya wait for rescue services near Sfax, on the Tunisian coast, on June 4, via CNN

As discussed on our human smuggling fees page, the costs of smuggling oneself in illegally are nontrivial (if you’re just interested in the prices, see this Havocscope page). Costs vary heavily by source country but are generally at least ten times the legal travel costs. Illegal immigration from China or India to the United States costs in the range of $50,000. And these are the pure financial costs, not the other costs of the journey, including the physical risks. This raises a natural question: who but the very wealthy could afford such sums? After all, most of the people who migrate illegally aren’t well-off. Where are they getting this money?

The most obvious answer (which is a non-answer of sorts) is that most people don’t. The legal barriers to migration are successful in keeping a significant fraction, probably a vast majority, of potential migrants, out. This is exactly why we are far from open borders and it’s such a radical proposal. As my co-blogger David Bennion wrote:

The immigration system isn’t broken, it is working as intended. But it needs to be broken; we need to break it.

Nonetheless, enough people do migrate in this manner for the phenomenon to be worth understanding. As I discussed in my blog post on snakeheads such as Sister Ping, a fair number of people migrate all the way from China to the United States in cramped ships, paying the huge human smuggling fees.

I outline three interconnected answers below. Here’s the list:

  1. Personal and family savings back home
  2. Financing by family members already in the destination country
  3. Loans from outside the family

Continue reading How can migrants afford huge smuggling fees? Three answers

My “Apparat” Piece

Open Borders note: Additional links have been added to the piece to facilitate reader exploration

Recently, I was invited to write a piece on open borders for the Russian online magazine Apparat. It was published as “7 причин, почему мир должен отказаться от государственных границ”, or something like, “Seven reasons why the world should abolish state borders.” The Spanish-edition translation is here. To what extent the Russian expresses a sentiment I’d endorse is hard to say, since, unlike some, I don’t want to abolish borders, but to allow people to migrate across them. (Jurisdictional frontiers between states are fine.) I wrote the article in an interview format, after which it went through the usual editorial process. I saw and approved a Russian-language draft, but what actually got published was different again.

The below is a kind of back-translation from the Russian. I’ve tried to strike a balance between accurately reflecting the meaning of the Russian text and accurately reflecting my own views, which were sometimes a bit obscured, not so much in translation, as in the editorial process. Sometimes I substituted back in passages from the original English version.

(their introduction)

To open the borders of states to all who wish to cross them is one of the most radical and unpopular ideas all over the world. However, not long ago in the USA, there appeared a movement among economists and scholars by the name “Open Borders.” Activists in this movement believe, that to prohibit people from moving to any country is not only immoral, but also greatly inefficient: the elimination of borders will substantially improve the world economy. Members of Open Borders assiduously defend their point of view in scholarly publications, interviews, and on their blog. Apparat asked one of them, the writer and economics professor Nathan Smith of Fresno Pacific University, why it’s a good idea to open the world’s borders.

(extracts from my e-mail interview)

  1. Open borders would improve the welfare of mankind

Open borders are estimated to be able to double world GDP. To see why, it’s first necessary to review economists’ efforts over the years to explain why some countries are so rich, and others are not. In part, this depends on how developed the social and political institutions of a country are. So when people move to places with more developed institutions, their productivity increases. It’s a lot easier to open a business in the USA, than in Afghanistan.

Second, open borders would raise the productivity of many industries [even in the West] by allowing greater specialization. American professors often mow their own lawns, and that may serve as a symbol of the inefficiency of migration control. Very few have the capability to research physics or philosophy, while almost anyone can mow a lawn. It would be more efficient, if professors hired others to mow lawns and focused on physics and philosophy. Billions of people worldwide would be glad to do such work for a few dollars an hour, but immigration restrictions prevent this.

Third, changes in the immigration regime could prevent productive activities from being relocated to suboptimal places. In the past thirty years or so, millions of factory jobs have moved from the USA to China, although it would be more convenient to locate them in America, where the legal system is more developed, and they would be closer to the US market. Open borders would allow workers to move to jobs, rather than jobs to workers.

  1. Unskilled workers are valuable, too, not just immigrants with higher education

Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg says that the USA needs to open its borders to “all the smartest and most talented,” because educated people stimulate innovation and positively influence the economy. It’s a strange misconception, though widespread, that only skilled specialists can benefit the economy. Unskilled workers also contribute.

I live in the Central Valley of California, one of the most agriculturally productive regions of the country. Most of the harvesting is done by Mexicans. Many of them are poorly educated and don’t speak English. Native-born Americans benefit from this. With no one to collect the harvest, agricultural land would lose value. In principle, farmers could hire native-born Americans, but then fruit would be more expensive and many farms would go out of business, while Mexicans would lose work that pays better than they could earn at home.

  1. Open borders will not erase international diversity

Concerning the influence of immigration policy on the cultures of different nations, it’s important to understand one thing. We should care about the welfare of people, not cultures or countries. It’s wrong to lock people into a country, if they want to emigrate and assimilate elsewhere.

But open borders would probably not deplete the world’s cultural diversity. I like to use Ireland as an example. Ireland was the homeland of many generations of emigrants, to the extent that today, many more people of Irish ancestry live outside Ireland, than in the country itself. This didn’t kill Irish culture, but on the contrary, helped it to spread. St. Patrick’s Day is now widely celebrated in America, and people all over the world love Irish music. Emigrants value the cultures they bring with them, and teach the foreigners among whom they settle, to love them as well.

  1. Open borders can address global inequality

Today the idea of open borders is very unpopular in the Western democracies. But that doesn’t mean it’s a bad idea. There was a time, when slavery was taken for granted, but now it’s been abolished, and everyone agrees that its abolition was right.

Europeans today attach great moral significance to having an egalitarian society, in which universal education, high taxes and high wages make the population relatively homogeneous. Because of these values, they don’t want to see poor immigrants on the streets [so they shut them out]. But how can economic equality within a country be regarded as a moral triumph, when there is far more inequality internationally is far greater?

Those who advocate open borders believe that helping the needy is a natural moral duty towards every person [not just co-nationals]. If you think about the economic, political, and other opportunities that open up before immigrants, the inconveniences to natives that would likely occur seem insignificant by comparison.

  1. Mass emigration would benefit poor countries

For the most part, poor countries would benefit from emigration. Emigrants send money home, and some return with useful skills and foreign contacts. They can be a positive influence on their relatives back home, inspiring them to become politically active and get educated. Emigration can also raise wages by making labor scarce.

I don’t think open borders would actually cause any country to be completely depopulated, though some of the world’s poorest countries might lose 80-90% of their populations. But if [for the sake of argument] there were a country where absolutely everyone emigrated, while one would hardly say that that country benefited from the change, it would be good for the people, who would find better lives somewhere else.

  1. Life needn’t get worse for the native population

Open borders would not lead to mass unemployment among natives, though it probably would lead to lower salaries for many. A fair comparison is furnished by the entry of women into the workforce since the 1960s. This probably did contribute to stagnation or decline in the wages of men, but not to mass unemployment, since labor markets are flexible, with a tendency to equilibrate. Something similar will happen with migration: no mass unemployment, but many wages will stagnate or fall. To offset this, it’s possible to charge surtaxes on migrants, and use the proceeds to compensate natives who suffer income losses due to competition from immigrants.

The dangers posed by immigration—for example, to Europeans, who especially fear Muslim immigration—are much exaggerated. That said, it would help if western Europeans were firmer in their principles. The cultural habits of Europeans were profoundly shaped by the influence of Christian and capitalist values, but today few of them have much belief in either. A kind of moral relativism prevails in Europe today, which makes it difficult for them to defend what is valuable in their heritage, to induce immigrants to assimilate to it.

I believe the problems of crime, violence, and ethnic hatred, which could arise under open borders, are also greatly exaggerated. In the USA, the crime rate has fallen sharply in the past twenty years, even as the number of immigrants has grown.

  1. Open borders and open citizenship are different things

American democracy has many faults, but it’s still pretty good as forms of government go. For two hundred years it has protected freedom of speech and religion, maintained civil peace, and to some extent, economic liberty. But if a few billion people migrated to the USA from all over the world and enjoyed the right to vote, the polity would be transformed beyond recognition. So it’s important to distinguish open borders from open citizenship.

To grant the right to vote to all comers is too risky. Under open borders as I envision it, hundreds of millions of people would live in the USA, under American laws, with their human and property rights respected, and with the right to work, but without rights of political representation. Some would be naturalized as citizens, and could vote and run for office, but naturalization would be a much slower and more restricted process.

Two subtle lessons from the “Your in America” Twitter bot

A while back, I had come across the Your in America bot. The bot locates instances of people tweeting complaints about immigrants and tourists in the United States not speaking English, where the tweets contain the grammatically incorrect phrase “your in America” (as explained here, it should be “you’re”).

The typical lesson that I suspect many people would draw from this is that the tweets are ironic: the authors of the tweets themselves don’t demonstrate good knowledge of English. Some might argue that such tweets demonstrate hypocrisy. I suspect that many people will look at these tweets and chuckle at their moral superiority to what they would consider the unsophisticated nativist right, a phenomenon I discussed here. While there’s some legitimacy to such a feeling of moral superiority, I think it’s not the main lesson to draw.

As I discussed in an earlier post, true tolerance, and true empathy, extend to the concerns of people who find the consequences of migration deeply unsettling. The people authoring the “Your in America” tweets are unsettled by an aspect of migration — the way it brings them in contact with people who are speaking a language they don’t understand — and this can be personally unsettling as well as impose business and operational costs. As such, this concern does not deserve to be mocked.

I draw two main lessons:

  1. Language proficiency has many levels, and different levels are necessary for different roles and goals
  2. Contempt and suspicion for outgroups is universal — but let’s not make it the basis of coercive policy

Continue reading Two subtle lessons from the “Your in America” Twitter bot

Paul Krugman and the Immigration Act of 1924

In 2006 Paul Krugman, prominent liberal economist and New York Times columnist, expressed concern that low-skilled immigration could threaten the American welfare state.  Due to this supposed threat and the claim that the wages of some Americans were lowered because of immigration, he supported a reduction in the number of low-skilled immigrants entering the U.S. (See here for this site’s page on Mr. Krugman.)

So it wasn’t surprising when Mr. Krugman recently declared that he didn’t support open borders.  What was surprising was that he justified immigration restrictions that were enacted in the early 1920s. He stated that without those restrictions the New Deal in the United States “wouldn’t have been possible,” in part because “…there would have been many claims, justified or not, about people flocking to America to take advantage of welfare programs.” The New Deal of the 1930s, as many readers may know, involved the establishment under Franklin D. Roosevelt of government programs which continue to exist today, such as monetary support for the elderly (Social Security) and aid to poor mothers and their children.

The immigration legislation to which Mr. Krugman referred included the Immigration Act of 1921, which established the first numerical restrictions on European immigration.  It was followed by the longer lasting Immigration Act of 1924, which also involved numerical restrictions and a national origins quota system in which visas were apportioned predominately to immigrants coming from northwest Europe. Maldwyn Jones, author of American Immigration, notes that:

it was American policy which brought to an end the century-long mass movement from Europe. The adoption of the quota system… all but slammed the door on the southern and eastern Europeans who had formed the bulk of the arrivals in the prewar (World War I) and immediate postwar periods. The result was that European immigration slumped from over 800,000 in 1921 to less than 150,000 by the end of the decade. (page 279)

The legislation was in many respects the model for our current immigration system, with its numerical limitations on immigration from individual countries, numerical limitations for certain categories of immigrants,  use of preference groups within these categories, consular control over permission to immigrate, and the creation of the Border Patrol. From an open borders perspective, it was a disaster, ending a long period of generally open immigration from Europe.

Whether or not Mr. Krugman is correct or not that the 1920s immigration restrictions helped to provide a political environment conducive to passing the New Deal legislation, there are two reasons why his support for the restrictions are surprising. One is that the legislation was largely racist. The Immigration Act of 1924 was inspired by racist sentiment and, as noted, discriminated against the immigration of people from eastern and southern Europe, who were perceived by some to be racially inferior. As John Higham has written in Strangers in the Land, as the House of Representatives worked towards the 1924 legislation, the champions of the legislation:

now largely ignored the economic arguments they had advanced in behalf of the first quota law three years before. Instead, they talked about preserving a ‘distinct American type,’ about keeping American for Americans, or about saving the Nordic race from being swamped. The Ku Klux Klan, which was organizing a vigorous letter-writing campaign in support of the Johnson bill, probably aided and abetted this swell of racial nativism… (page 321)

The second reason why it is surprising Mr. Krugman would be supportive of the 1924 immigration law is that because it, combined with other restrictionist maneuvering, blocked many of Europe’s Jews from fleeing the Nazis during the 1930s and 1940s. David Wyman has written in Paper Walls that,

if, in the crucial years from 1938 to 1941, the world had opened its doors to the victims of persecution, the history of Europe’s Jews from 1942 to 1945 would have been significantly different. Instead the barriers held firm and relatively few refugees found asylum. (page xiii)

Mr. Wyman also has noted that although America received more refugees (about 250,000) from Nazism than other countries during the period 1933 to 1945 (p. 209),  “the total response of the United States… fell tragically short of the need.” (preface) According to Mr. Wyman, it was the 1924 law that was the fundamental barrier to the people seeking refuge in the U.S., noting that “the quota limitations formed by far the most significant bulwark against large-scale American rescue of refugees.” (p. 210)

It is difficult to determine the number of would-be refugees who were killed because of U.S. immigration restrictions.  However, the following information from the United States Memorial Holocaust Museum site suggests the large numbers who were put at risk from the restrictions:

In late 1938, 125,000 applicants lined up outside US consulates hoping to obtain 27,000 visas under the existing immigration quota. By June 1939, the number of applicants had increased to over 300,000. Most visa applicants were unsuccessful.

The fate of 908 refugees aboard the ship named the St. Louis who were denied refuge in the U.S. in 1939 is more certain, with 254 perishing in the Holocaust.  Mr. Wyman also notes that other refugee ships, either without a place to land or planning to land illegally in Palestine, sank, drowning hundreds. (pp. 38-39)

Mr. Krugman must surely be bothered by the racist nature of the 1924 legislation and must certainly wish that the U.S. had been more welcoming to refugees during the Nazi period. Furthermore he has noted that he is “grateful that the door was open when my grandparents fled Russia.” Had his grandparents tried to enter America after the 1924 restrictions were in place, they may not have been allowed in and may have perished at the hands of the Nazis.

How does Mr. Krugman square all this with his support for the 1924 immigration legislation? Was the suffering associated with the legislation an acceptable sacrifice in order to ensure that the New Deal legislation could be passed? Mr. Krugman might respond to this question by wishing that the U.S. had adopted a more generous refugee policy during the Nazi period within a system of immigration restriction, but the fact is that the U.S. didn’t.

Of course, even setting aside the history of the American immigration system’s response to the refugees fleeing the Nazis, the suffering associated with immigration restrictions are immense. Co-blogger Nathan Smith challenges Mr. Krugman’s suggestion that the American welfare state is of higher moral value than open borders.  He writes that: 

Krugman wants a social democratic welfare state even at the cost of excluding most of mankind by force. I start from a utilitarian universalist ethics and conclude that its need for immigration exclusion renders the welfare state a moral travesty. 

Nathan argues that a truly moral anti-poverty policy would focus on alleviating the extreme poverty of the Third World rather than the poverty found in the U.S.:  “Domestic redistribution is at best from the very-rich to the relatively-rich.”  He writes that “the best thing America could do for the poor is to open the borders.”

I support both open borders and the welfare state.  Fortunately, perhaps with the use of keyhole solutions, countries may be able to have both. Mr. Krugman should explore this possibility, as well as reconsider his support for the 1924 immigration legislation.

Featured image: Paul Krugman’s press conference following his receipt of the Nobel Prize in Economics, by Prolineserver from Wikimedia Commons.