[UPDATE: Check out Nathan’s related post Immigration and Institutions]
In my previous post on intelligence, international development, and immigration, I referenced some of the writings of Garett Jones. I sent an email to Jones asking him for his thoughts on the post, and he replied with the following email:
A very nice, thoughtful post. Thank you for giving my writings a careful reading. Much appreciated.
I’d have one critique of your claim, one that is common to many supporters of freer low-skill immigration.
You claim that institutions are important, something I agree with. And you claim that low IQ populations tend to have bad institutions, partly because of the low IQ population, again something I agree with.
But from there you conclude that low-IQ immigrants should be allowed to come to countries with good institutions. That might be reasonable as a moral case but I’m no expert on morality so I’ll leave that to others.
I would emphasize a different conclusion: That the low-IQ immigrants will tend to worsen the institutions of the higher-IQ countries they move to. Low IQ immigrants will, to some degree, tend to make the country they move to more like the country they came from.
Partly this will be due to MRV and Caplan/Miller reasons: low IQ groups vote for bad policies. Partly it’s because they will tend to elect individuals from their constituencies, which will, on average, tend to lower the average IQ of the legislature. And partly it’s because the bureaucracy will tend to hire individuals from low-skill groups, which will lower government quality.
For these and other reasons, new low IQ citizens impose a tax on the nation’s institutions, and this institutional cost should be counted in a candid cost-benefit analysis.
*Shorter version: Good institutions are rare treasures, and institutions are endogenous with respect to (among other things) citizen IQ. *
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Again, many thanks for drawing attention to my work, much appreciated.
I think Jones is correct, particularly for those aspects of institutions that are determined through electoral political processes (for more on the political externalities arguments made by restrictionists, see political externalities). I should have acknowledged more explicitly in my original post. This concern would have less applicability to market processes or to those aspects of the law that are deeply entrenched and less subject to political change. [UPDATE: Nathan Smith’s comment below reminded me that I should mention the following: even for those of you who consider the political externalities case to be serious, there are keyhole solutions to the problem such as guest worker programs that allow people to migrate to work but don’t given them voting rights. The focus of this post, however, is to consider the strength of the concern per se, not to propose remedies.]
I still stand by the key point of the original post, namely, that sustaining high quality institutions is a lot easier than creating high quality institutions, and even low IQ people would be able to discern that institutions in the country they migrate to are better than institutions in the country they migrated from, which would limit (but not eliminate) their desire to recreate the situation of their source country.
To make my point a little clearer, I’m arguing that it’s a lot harder to improve a country’s poor institutions by importing a lot of high IQ people than it is to sustain a country’s good institutions even allowing low IQ immigration (importing the institutions themselves might work — that’s the hope behind charter cities). In a sense, I’m arguing that institutions have their own inertia. This argument can be thought of as a version of status quo bias, and it has been made by Bryan Caplan in his digest version of the political externalities of open borders, where he writes (emphasis added by me):
2. The political effect of immigrants on markets and liberty is at worst modestly negative. The median American isn’t a libertarian, and the median immigrant isn’t a Stalinist. We’re talking about marginal disagreements between social democrats, nothing more. Immigrants’ low voter turnout and status quo bias further dilute immigrants’ negative political effect.
I’m actually arguing something slightly stronger: institutions have their own inertia, but good institutions have more inertia than poor institutions, even with low IQ populations, because people can see the results and tell the difference, at least when it’s sufficiently dramatic. They may misdiagnose the causes, and may even misjudge minor differences. But they’re unlikely to undo all the gains achieved through improved institutions.
In Jones’ language, my framing of his assertions that “institutions are endogenous to (among other things) a country’s IQ” would be that it is changes in institutions that are endogenous to a country’s IQ.
That said, I do agree with Jones that, viewed solely from the angle of the quality of institutions in the target country, immigration of low IQ people could have a negative impact, or, even if not a direct negative impact, an “opportunity cost” (i.e., institutions don’t improve as rapidly as they otherwise might).
Vipul Naik founded the Open Borders website in March 2012. See also:
Vipul Naik’s personal statement
Vipul Naik’s description of open borders on his personal site
Page about Vipul Naik on Open Borders
Jones says that:
“Partly this will be due to MRV and Caplan/Miller reasons: low IQ groups vote for bad policies. Partly it’s because they will tend to elect individuals from their constituencies, which will, on average, tend to lower the average IQ of the legislature. And partly it’s because the bureaucracy will tend to hire individuals from low-skill groups, which will lower government quality.”
But this is an argument against permitting and enfranchising immigrants, not against open borders. It’s quite possible to allow anyone to come, but to have a quite different procedure for deciding who gets to vote. In Principles of a Free Society, I propose that immigrants under a new open-borders visa program be subject to surtaxes and mandatory savings for a while, and only be granted citizenship later, after forfeiting a fixed “citizenship threshold” of savings. It’s true that open borders without some arrangement of this sort changes the identity of the median voter in an unfavorable way. It’s even easier to maintain high hiring standards for the bureaucracy, which obviously doesn’t have to, and doesn’t, hire a representative cross-section of the resident population.
Garett knows more about this than I do, but I wonder whether we really know that average IQ (or median) is what affects the quality of institutions. If I were to hypothesize that the maintenance of high-quality institutions depends mainly on the characteristics of an elite, and need not be much affected by adverse changes in the composition of the broad mass of the population, would the evidence that Garett has studied contradict me?
Hi Nathan,
Thanks for the comment about distinguishing between permitting and enfranchising immigrants. This is of course covered in the guest worker programs section on the site, and would be relevant if one were trying to solve the problem. My goal with the post was more to discuss the extent to which the problem exists, rather than propose solutions. But I’ve added a link to the guest worker programs page in the post now.
Your comment about the existence of an “elite” is also interesting. In an email exchange two years ago, Jones suggested that existing research points to both average IQ and max IQ mattering but min IQ not mattering so much. I will forward the exchange to you by email; I haven’t asked Jones for permission to post it publicly so I won’t post it here.
Please keep in mind, though, that in countries with birthright citizenship (such as the U.S.), the children of low-IQ immigrants will have First World citizenship–and thus First World voting rights–even if their parents won’t.
Indeed, are you advocating ending birthright citizenship?
Do you favor ending birthright citizenship? After all, birthright citizenship will allow the U.S.-born children of low IQ immigrants to have U.S. citizenship even if their parents will not.
Also, considering how much of a demand there is among the public for adequate minority representation in the Ivy Leagues, in medical schools, et cetera, I find it hard to believe that the same would not also be true for the bureaucracy sooner or later.
There is a phrase attributed to Antonio Gramsci which is apt here, I think: “the long march through the institutions”. It meant that instead of violent revolution, the West would become socialist by convincing Western minds — which would be achieved by infiltrating the institutions. Gramsci wrote in the thirties and by 1960 the Soviet Union had the following goals written down, in relation to American institutions:
– overload the Welfare System (to cause a crisis);
– obtain “peace through disarmament”;
– make America give foreign aid to its own enemies;
– make America support the UN;
– put Leftist judges on the Supreme Court;
– present homosexuality as normal;
– place Leftist professors in the universities;
– allow the media to be infiltrated;
– promote pornography;
– prevent children from saying grace in schools;
– promote gun control;
– use radical environmentalism to destroy US industry;
– distort Biblical Christianity.
This was all layed out by the Soviets in the early ’60s and they have done marvelously well.
There is no “inertia” when there are agents working behind the scenes to undermine American institutions.
From where do you get this list, Artur? Much of it resembles items from Cleon Skousen’s book “The Naked Communist,” and while I haven’t read the book, I have my doubts that Skousen was a reliable authority on the Soviets’ secret written goals.
Do you have a citation for the Soviet goals vis a vis the U.S.?
Vipul,
“John, I must disagree here a bit on what immigrant rights groups want. The Immigration Policy Center wrote a stinging piece on Red Cards. Note that Red Cards did not include amnesty, but did not forbid amnesty either: it was simply dealing with freedom to move and work, and explicitly stayed away from the issue of paths to citizenship. That the IPC opposed this plan virulently tells us something about their attitude.”
Actually the IPC piece you link to suggests that they would be amenable to Red Cards + some amnesty. Their main concern, it sounds like, is that Red Cards are being used as a political figleaf to avoid any amnesty (which, it sounds, is something that BK would find desirable). I never said that Red Cards would be a desired policy of groups like the IPC; like you, I think they are quite lukewarm, at best, on true open borders.
My point is that since moderate restrictionists are actually amenable to Red Cards, and immigrants’ rights activists want some kind of amnesty, it’s logical that both oppose what the other desires, and also plausible that both sides can compromise a bit on what they want to get to a solution that we, the open borders advocates, would find acceptable.
“Even if you support a path to citizenship, that is no reason to oppose a bill that improves the freedom of migration while leaving the path to citizenship at the status quo.”
Completely agree. I think, however, that the problem is that there is no path to citizenship at all for most who have previously immigrated unlawfully to the US, even if they have lived there a long time. And even those who might have an arduous path to legal residence face considerable uncertainty in doing so; see this article on Obama’s “amnesty” for instance, which points out few are taking advantage of it because the uncertainty and risk surrounding the decision to pursue amnesty are just too high: http://www.vcstar.com/news/2012/oct/30/navarrette-immigrants-dream-disappears/?opinion=1
For people already living in the US, it’s understandable that living life nearly like a Jew hiding from the Nazis would make them want to prioritise some kind of amnesty over Red Cards — especially if they fear that the public’s or policymakers’ attention-span for immigration is limited. If we can only get the US government to change one thing about its immigration policy, and the choice is between implementing Red Cards or amnesty for unauthorised immigrants, it’s a very tough call to make. I’m not saying you’re wrong, but I can see why immigrants’ rights groups would be concerned.
If pro-amnesty groups and pro-Red Card groups are both halfway between open borders advocates and restrictionists along different dimensions, they could compromise in one of two ways: compromise to the restrictionist position, or compromise to the open borders position. It seems that in practice, both groups prefer to compromise toward the restrictionist position. This may be more a feature of status quo bias and political gridlock. But I think more fundamentally it is because of the priorities of both these half-way-point groups.
I have a blog post I plan to publish soon that goes into the typology in more detail — check in an hour or so. [UPDATE: It’s here]
“It seems that in practice, both groups prefer to compromise toward the restrictionist position. This may be more a feature of status quo bias and political gridlock. But I think more fundamentally it is because of the priorities of both these half-way-point groups.”
I agree with your analysis. I wouldn’t chalk *all* of their resistance up to those nativist priorities, however, even if those priorities are the main reason. As I’ve hinted, I believe status quo bias and political gridlock play a role too. There are undoubtedly restrictionists who haven’t thought about an open borders keyhole solution-style compromise because of status quo bias or reluctance to contemplate political compromise — just as there are immigrants’ rights groups in the same boat. I’m confident there are some people in both groups who, on reflection, would be persuaded by a keyhole solution approach, even if these people don’t constitute a majority of them.
BK,
“My sense is that this isolation from migrant neighborhood externalities is related to the comparatively low levels of grumbling on the part of Singaporeans about the number of foreign workers, and thus the high number present. What would be the largest cut in the number of migrants accepted you would be willing to trade for changing the housing policy?”
I think the costs of such a policy for a country like Singapore are low. It’s a city-state with a unique bureaucracy. Such a housing policy at the national level would be totally unrealistic in larger countries. I also don’t know how much I believe this policy has been actually beneficial in terms of social cohesion. Singapore does all sorts of funky things with its housing policy (e.g. trying to ensure a racially diverse population in its HDB flats — if there’s been an immediate benefit from this, it’s not obvious). It’s not clear to me that this policy is effective (immigrants still interact with society at large, even if they don’t live in Singaporeans’ immediate vicinity), or even if it were, that it would be effective in a country larger than a city-state.
“If even a tenuous route is sufficient, one could used saved earnings to get an education and come in as foreign talent or marry a Singaporean, no?”
Anecdotal evidence indicates even foreign nationals from developed countries who marry Singaporeans have significant difficulty getting residency in Singapore. And by law, blue collar workers require Singapore’s government’s permission to marry a Singaporean citizen. It’s not plausible to me that a Thai construction worker who, against the odds, falls in love with and marries a Singaporean woman and decides to settle in Singapore, would actually be able to do so. I also don’t think being a white-collar worker should be a prerequisite for citizenship, so making citizenship available to foreign talent, while a good idea, is not sufficient without some mechanism for blue-collar workers who do decide to make their destination their new home.
To be clear, I’m not sure if changing these citizenship policies would make a difference for Singapore because of how unique it is. It’s implausible that a lot of people in the world would want to permanently settle in Singapore, especially blue-collar workers, so although I’m sure Singapore’s policies harm some people, they don’t harm many. The policies of a larger country, like Australia for instance, are where things like this can make a meaningful difference.
“It seems to me that the citizenship restriction is the most critical feature in making Singaporean institutions stable while accommodating so many low-skill workers to mutual benefit.”
Well, yes, I agree citizenship is probably not something a state should be handing out to every Tom, Dick, and Harry. That doesn’t mean the only choices are “no citizenship for blue-collar workers” and “everyone who immigrates here gets to become a citizen”. Again, in Singapore’s case, the former extreme is both more enforceable and less harmful because it’s a tiny city-state and it’s difficult to settle more people in there, especially blue-collar workers. That doesn’t mean this policy is ideal, or workable in larger countries. A policy like “all guest workers who have been resident continuously for 10 years can apply for permanent residency” doesn’t seem, prima facie, to be a bad one to me. If someone likes your country enough to live there for 10 years, they probably like your society enough to want to assimilate to it.
“If Germany or the United States did those things they would also be able to operate enormous scale foreign worker programs, this time to the benefit of hundreds of millions of foreign low-skill workers. I don’t see how country size is important at all.”
Country size is relevant to the question of naturalisation/settlement policy because:
1. A city can enforce much more paternalist policies (e.g. Bloomberg’s banning large soft drink cups, Singapore’s requiring government approval for marriages between blue-collar immigrants and Singaporean nationals) than most national governments;
2. Blue-collar workers are going to find it less realistic to settle permanently in a city-state than in other countries, which feature much more pockets of diversity (it wouldn’t be realistic for many Thais or Indonesians to settle in Singapore, but it would actually be pretty realistic for them to do this in Malaysia, or even the Philippines, because there are more economic and cultural niches they can fill there)
“Surely descent wouldn’t be a bar to qualifying as a high-skill immigrant oneself? “Finish that math or engineering degree, pass a test of knowledge, and you too can become an American!””
This doesn’t pass my personal sniff test of justice, because this requirement is being applied only to people unlucky enough to have not been born American citizens. If every person who wanted to be American, including those born to American citizens, had to meet these qualifications, I would find it odd, but much more defensible.
One important mechanism of immigration is that it benefits not just the migrant, but in the case of the migrant who settles, the migrant’s children. I think Nathan may have made this point elsewhere already, but blue-collar workers can and do have children capable of much more intellectually-demanding work. Many times, people make the decision to settle somewhere new for their children’s benefit (in fact, this is what drove most of my family’s decisions to move somewhere new).
If we keep out the Indian labourer because he’s not smart enough to settle in our country, we’re also keeping out his son or daughter who could be the next Bose or Ramanujan. Given the state of the education system in most developing countries, it’s quite plausible that Bose or Ramanujan Jr. will never see their talents develop beyond, say, primary school level. Few people are opposed in principle to immigration for tertiary education — but the same principles underlying that seem to me just as applicable to parents who want to give their children a better primary or secondary education.
To expand on my last point about equity in the granting of citizenship, I recognise that at some point countries have to differentiate between birthright citizens (whether by jus soli or jus sanguinis) and naturalised citizens. But requiring a very specialised test of knowledge such as a STEM degree strikes me as going too far; it’s obviously designed to prevent all but above-average IQ people from ever attaining citizenship.
I don’t think most people would define their nationality or citizenship by a level of IQ. These things are defined by shared values, ideas, experiences. To me, a test of residency or cultural assimilation makes much more sense for naturalisation requirements. A STEM degree, on the other hand, does not seem prima facie justifiable.
A couple points:
1. On a micro level low IQ people are more productive in higher IQ societies because they are being supervised by higher IQ people. As more low IQ people join a society there are proportionally fewer higher IQ people to go round and provide the necessary level of supervision. This applies to both to working private business, and to society in general, where the supervisors include police, court officials, bureaucrats etc.
2. RE: “people can see the results and tell the difference, at least when it’s sufficiently dramatic”
Doesn’t Caplan’s work on democracy completely contradict this? The people at large have no idea what makes for good institutions.
On 2, no, Caplan’s work does not contradict this. Caplan’s work is about whether people can successfully identify linkages from politicians’ platforms and policies to their effects on the economy, not about whether they can make out whether one economy is more prosperous than the other. Further, the “rational irrationality” mechanism identified by Caplan is likely most applicable in situations such as voting, where the probability of influencing the outcome is so low that the cost of cognitive error is near-zero.
What I’m saying is that immigrants will not have a particular desire to re-create the conditions of their homeland which is clearly less prosperous. That said, they may be likely to favor some policies at the margin that are similar to those in their homeland, but that they don’t link to the failure of their homeland. However, in this respect, they are not too different from economically illiterate natives. The point here is that just because a certain policy is used in the home country of the immigrant, does not mean they are more likely to support that bad policy. Some of them may actually oppose the policy more because of their experience living its consequences, others may support it because it feels familiar, but my guess is these effects even out.
[Some empirical ways to test this prediction might be to look at specific policies, like universal health care, price ceilings, price floors, etc. and see if a migrant’s source country predicts the migrant’s view on these issues, further to check if the relationship holds after controlling for other indicators]
Setting aside the immigration issue for a moment, in cases that politicians have implemented populist and highly disastrous policies like price controls, the backlash has been quite overwhelming. Even if the public failed to connect the dots from price controls to shortages, their greater dislike of shortages compared to their desire for price controls means that politicians have an incentive to ignore voters’ demand for price controls.
“sustaining high quality institutions is a lot easier than creating high quality institutions”
Assuming this is a robust tendency, at best it gets you to the place where we should have somewhat more immigration. Since more low IQ immigration will degrade institutions, however slightly, and you can’t keep that up forever. Even with institutional inertia, eventually you will reach a point where they _will_ degrade until they are not much better than the home country of the low IQ immigrants.
This was worked out 11 years ago. By 2050 the US is going to experience a 3 point drop in mean IQ because of immigration across our southern border and this will result in a 15% drop in per-capita GDP.
http://www.lagriffedulion.f2s.com/imm.htm