All posts by Vipul Naik

A conceptual framework for empirical analysis of migration (part 1: direct empirical measurement)

This post is part 1 of a series outlining a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of migration. Read the introductory post to the series here. This post focuses on a particular form of comparison that can be carried out through direct empirical measurement. The questions directly answered this way aren’t the ones we are usually most interested in. But at least these are questions for which we can obtain precise answers in principle. That’s a start.

Questions about how different groups of people compare for a given regime at a given point in time (or over an interval of time) can be answered by direct empirical measurement, at least for existing regimes. They cannot be directly answered for hypothetical regimes. But the fact that they can be answered at all differentiates them from other, more speculative, questions.

(Source country, target country) pairs as the basis of aggregation

The conceptual model we use identifies two attributes of a person: the person’s source country (also known as the sending country, and defined as the country that person was born in) and the person’s target country (also known as the receiving country or recipient country, and defined as the country the person now lives in). For non-migrants, the source and target country coincide. For migrants, the source and target country differ. For every individual, therefore, we can write down a (source country, target country) pair. For instance, somebody born in Mexico who stays in Mexico gets the pair (Mexico,Mexico). Somebody born in Nepal who moves to India gets the pair (Nepal,India). (This is obviously a very crude simplified model, because some people migrate temporarily, some migrate to one country and then to another, etc. But it’s good enough to get us started).

We’re interested in the performance on indicator X both for people who stay put in their countries, and for people with particular (source country, target country) combinations. For instance, we may be interested in asking: how does the (Nepal, India) combination fare on indicator X? Explicitly, that’s asking: how do people who are from Nepal and living in India perform on indicator X?

Mathematical digression: using a matrix representation to store the information

We can use a matrix representation where the rows correspond to source countries and the columns correspond to target countries (both rows and columns should be the same list of countries in the same order for the observations below to hold). The entry in a given cell provides information on indicator X about the collection of people whose source country is the row country and whose target country is the column country.

Let’s explicitly consider the case of three countries. Let’s say country 1 is France, country 2 is Germany, and country 3 is the United Kingdom. The indicator X values for these source and target countries can be codified via a matrix:

$latex \begin{pmatrix} x_{11} & x_{12} & x_{13} \\ x_{21} & x_{22} & x_{23} \\ x_{31} & x_{32} & x_{33} \\\end{pmatrix}$

The nine entries are interpreted as follows:

  • $latex x_{11}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people in country 1 (France) who stay in France.
  • $latex x_{12}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 1 (France) to country 2 (Germany).
  • $latex x_{13}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 1 (France) to country 3 (the UK).
  • $latex x_{21}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 2 (Germany) to country 1 (France).
  • $latex x_{22}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people in country 2 (Germany) who stay in Germany.
  • $latex x_{23}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 2 (Germany) to country 3 (the UK).
  • $latex x_{31}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 3 (the UK) to country 1 (France).
  • $latex x_{32}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 3 (the UK) to country 2 (Germany).
  • $latex x_{33}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people in country 3 (the UK) who stay in the UK.

Note that the entries on the main diagonal (the one from top left to bottom left), namely $latex x_{11}$, $latex x_{22}$, and $latex x_{33}$, correspond to the non-migrants, i.e., the people who stay put in their country. The off-diagonal entries, i.e., the entries $latex x_{ij}, i \ne j$, correspond to migrants. In this case, there are six such entries: $latex x_{12}, x_{13}, x_{21}, x_{23}, x_{31}, x_{32}$.

The three countries in the example above weren’t ordered in any particular way, so there is no significance of an entry being above or below the diagonal. If the countries had been ordered based on some criterion (such as GDP (PPP) per capita), then the entries above and below the diagonal would reflect different types of migration based on whether the sending or receiving country had higher GDP (PPP) per capita.

The simplified example here considers migration between three countries. However, if we want to study migration worldwide, we’d need to include all countries. If there are 200 countries, then we’d have a $latex 200 \times 200$ matrix, with a total of 40,000 entries. In general, if there are $latex n$ countries, the matrix is a $latex n \times n$ matrix with a total of $latex n^2$ entries, of which there are $latex n$ diagonal entries (corresponding to the people who stay put in their respective countries) and $latex n^2 – n = n(n-1)$ off-diagonal entries (corresponding to people who migrate from one country to another). Half of them ($latex n(n – 1)/2$) are above the diagonal. and the other half are below the diagonal, but the above/below distinction is of importance only if the countries are ordered according to some criterion.

Now, there may be cases where migration between two countries is so quantitatively small, or even actually zero, that it’s not meaningful to compute that particular matrix entry. For instance, I think there is zero migration from North Korea to Somalia. So, some entries of the matrix are not defined. This means that we need to be careful if we intend to subject the matrix to techniques of linear algebra. However, we’re using the matrix only to store information, and we don’t perform matrix operations.

End mathematical digression

Totals versus averages

In some cases, we care about the per capita level of an indicator. This is usually the case for indicators such as GDP per capita, crime, or unemployment. In cases where fixed resources are being used up, however, we may care more about the total use. An example may be water use in a country that has a fairly limited water supply. If we’re concerned about total use, then in addition to knowing the per capita value on indicator X for (source country, target country) pairs, we also need to know the size of the population.

The relative size of different populations may matter even if we are concerned only about averages, because we need relative sizes to compute weighted averages.

Weighted averages for residents, naturals, immigrants, and emigrants

In some cases, we are interested not in a particular (source country, target country) combination, but in combining information for all people in a particular source or target country. The following are four typical weighted averages we are interested in. If we are looking at a total of $latex n$ countries, then there are $latex n$ weighted averages of each type (one for each country) and therefore a total of $latex 4n$ weighted averages to consider.

  • The weighted average for all residents of a country, including natives of the country who stay put and migrants from other countries to that country.
  • The weighted average for all naturals of a country, including natives of that country who stay put and people from that country who migrate to other countries.
  • The weighted average for all immigrants to a country, i.e., people who have that as their target country but are from other source countries.
  • The weighted average for all emigrants from a country, i.e., people who have that as their source country but now live in other countries.

Typical forms of comparison

After figuring out how various (source country, target country) combinations, or weighted averages thereof, fare, we can then ask how they compare with one another. Here are some typical questions that can be asked. We’ll use the letter A to denote a hypothetical source country and the letter B to denote a hypothetical target country, but you can replace these with concrete instances (such as France and the United Kingdom):

  1. How do migrants from country A to country B compare with natives of country B (the target country) on indicator X?
  2. How do migrants from country A to country B compare with natives of country A (the source country) on indicator X?
  3. How do migrants to country B compare with resident natives of that country on X?
  4. How do migrants from country A compare with resident natives of that country on X?
  5. How do migrants from country A compare with the natives of the countries they go to on X (combined analysis for all countries they go to)?
  6. How do migrants to country B compare with the natives of their source countries on X (combined analysis for all source countries)?
  7. How do migrants in general compare with non-migrants in general on X?
  8. How do natives of a country receiving migrants compare with natives of a country sending migrants on X? One advantage of this question is that it can be asked without collecting separate statistics on migrants, and can also be asked prior to implementation of migration policies, although the answer might change after implementation of the migration policies.

Mathematical digression: interpretation of the questions in matrix terms

Here is how each of the questions would look like in terms of the matrix representation. For illustrative purposes, we will continue to draw on the three-country setup above with country 1 as France, country 2 as Germany, and country 3 as the United Kingdom.

  1. Compare a matrix entry with the diagonal entry in its column. If we’re interested in studying migration from the UK to France, we compare the entry $latex x_{31}$ (migrants from the UK to France) with the entries $latex x_{11}$ (French natives who stay put).
  2. Compare a matrix entry with the diagonal entry in its row. If we’re interested in studying migration from the UK to France, we compare the entry $latex x_{31}$ (migrants from the UK to France) with the entries $latex x_{33}$ (UK natives who stay put).
  3. Compare the (weighted) average of the off-diagonal entries in a column with the diagonal entry of that column. If we are interested in understanding migration to Germany, we need to compare the entries $latex x_{12}$ and $latex x_{32}$ (migrants from France and the UK to Germany) with $latex x_{22}$ (Germans who stay put). We would usually compute the average of $latex x_{12}$ and $latex x_{32}$ weighted by the respective population sizes.
  4. Compare the (weighted) average of the off-diagonal entries in a row with the diagonal entry of that row. If we are interested in understanding migration from France, we need to compare the entries $latex x_{12}$ and $latex x_{13}$ (migrants from France to Germany and to the UK) with the entry $latex x_{11}$ (French who stay put).
  5. A bunch of pairwise comparisons of the type seen in Question 1 (with pairs in the same column). If we’re interested in figuring out how migrants from France compare with the natives wherever they go. Then, we will compare $latex x_{12}$ with $latex x_{22}$ (comparing French migrants to Germany with Germans who stay put), and separately compare $latex x_{13}$ with $latex x_{33}$ (comparing French migrants to the UK with UK natives who stay put).
  6. A bunch of pairwise comparisons of the type seen in Question 2 (with pairs in the same row). If we’re interested in figuring out how migrants to the UK fare relative to the natives of their source country. Then, we will compare $latex x_{13}$ with $latex x_{11}$ (French who move to the UK versus French who stay put), and separately compare $latex x_{23}$ with $latex x_{22}$ (Germans who move to the UK versus Germans who stay put).
  7. The off-diagonal entries represent migrants, and the diagonal entries represents people who do not migrate. This question therefore involves a comparison of the off-diagonal entries and the diagonal entries.
  8. This compares two diagonal entries. If we’re interested in comparing Germany and the UK, we’ll compare $latex x_{22}$ and $latex x_{33}$.

End mathematical digression

Remarks on selection and treatment effects

We’ll return to this in more depth in part 2, but here are a few preliminary remarks.

The significance of the migration policy regime and other aspects of the scenario (economic policies, economic performance, linguistic differences, etc.) on the indicator matrix is two-fold:

  • A compositional selection effect (for short, we’ll call this a selection effect or a compositional effect) for the groupings, i.e., the choice of the migration policy scenario determines who migrates and who doesn’t, and therefore affects what set of people get included in various (source country, target country) pairs.
  • A treatment effect for the groupings, i.e., some people being able to migrate affects their own performance on indicator X, and also affect the performance on the indicator of others who stay behind in their own countries.

In Part 2, we will look more closely at how to isolate selection and treatment effects when comparing different policy regimes.

Remarks on measurability

For existing policy regimes, the performance on particular indicators of particular (source country, target country) pairs can be computed in principle. Some methods involve complete measurement: for instance, census data that asks people to identify their country of origin, or computerized records of all residents along with their source country. Other methods involve the use of partial data along with sampling techniques to extrapolate to the general population.

Some challenges:

  • In some cases, there is ambiguity, both conceptual and empirical, on the source country of individuals, or on what it means to be a resident (for instance, do we count crimes by tourists?)
  • In some cases, people deliberately conceal or misrepresent information about themselves where the stakes are high. For instance, a foreign-born person may claim to be a native-born when arrested for a misdemeanor, in order to avoid deportation. On the other hand, those who prefer deportation to another country to spending time in prison may misrepresent themselves as foreign-born. People may lie to get access to welfare benefits. False identity documentation may be produced in order to be eligible to work.
  • In some cases, the population involved is so small that the indicator cannot be measured from small samples of the overall population. For instance, there are about 100 people in the US who were born in North Korea. A random sample would probably not pick any of them. Even if it did, statistical averages for the population would not be robust.
  • There are challenges when considering the comparability of indicators across different target countries (and in some cases even within a particular country), because different countries (and different jurisdictions within a country) use different protocols for measurement and have different sources of bias. For instance, the rate of crime reporting may differ considerably between countries, particularly for rape and minor theft. Similarly, when comparing income values, purchasing power parity estimates are not necessarily reliable.

Normative significance of comparisons

The measurements and comparisons here offer only a starting point for investigating the effects of migration: we’d need comparative statics between different regimes in order to tease out the effects of migration. We’ll talk about this more in part 2 and in part 3. But in many cases, our only reliable empirical measurements are the direct ones discussed here, and people often draw conclusions based on this evidence. The following are three typical styles of crude conclusion people draw.

  • Immigrants to country B do better (respectively, worse) on the indicator than natives of country B who stay in their country $latex \implies$ immigration “good” (respectively, “bad”) for country B.
  • Emigrants from country A do better (respectively, worse) on the indicator than natives of country A $latex \implies$ emigration “bad” (cf. brain drain) (respectively, “good”) for country A.
  • Natives of country A worse on the indicator than natives of country B $latex \implies$ Migration from country A to country B good for country A and bad for country B.

Of course, put so bluntly, the claims seem obviously ill-substantiated, and they often break down in practice.

But apart from the need to do more sophisticated counterfactual analysis to actually talk about the effects of migration, there’s another important point: the overall levels of an indicator might matter more than how different groups compare on it. The relative crime rates of natives and migrants are not as important as knowing whether either group has a high crime rate. The relative fertility rates are similarly less important than the overall fertility level. Too much focus on the question of “are immigrants better than natives?” can lead us to ignore other questions of greater moral and practical relevance.

Open borders within India (part 1)

What are some examples of large multilingual zones with internal open borders? The EU (particularly the Schengen area) comes to mind, but it’s relatively recent, and most parts of the EU are quite well-developed. A perhaps more interesting example, particularly for those concerned about the Third World, is internal open borders and intranational migration within India.

I intend to cover India in a series of two blog posts, of which this is the first one. This post (part 1) discusses the size and diversity of India, whether India truly has open borders, relations with nearby countries, secesssionist movements, and overall migration statistics. In part 2, I’ll look more closely at local attitudes to migration, the economic data on migrant performance, as well as episodes with unusually high levels of immigration and emigration for specific regions, usually in the wake of natural or man-made disasters.

Size and diversity of India, compared with Europe and Africa

The population of India is a little over 1.2 billion. Compare this with the population of Europe (about 800 million), Africa (about 1.1 billion), and the European Union (about 500 million).

India is linguistically diverse. Hindi is the most widely used native language in India, and it is the main language of North India, though it comes in many dialects, many of which differ considerably from the version taught in schools. There are an estimated 180 million native speakers of Hindi, or about 15% of India’s total population, though probably a larger percentage of the population (perhaps up to 50%) has a working knowledge of Hindi sufficient for rudimentary oral communication (such as in shops or restaurants). Due to linguistic diversity, English is widely used as a language of official communication within the country, and English fluency is considered a marker of high status, opening access to a wide range of jobs. Wikipedia lists 22 major regional languages in India, each with its own well-developed script and grammar. Some of these languages, including Hindi, have well-developed literatures of their own, and some have movie industries (the biggest of these, Bollywood, is the world’s second largest movie industry after Hollywood, and might well overtake Hollywood on some metrics in the near future). The linguistic diversity of India is in the same ballpark as that of the European Union, which lists 24 official languages and 3 semi-official languages. India and the EU are also similar in that English plays an important role as a language for official communication. While English knowledge of the EU residents as a whole is greater than that of Indians, the most educated Indians probably have comparable English knowledge to the corresponding top slice of EU residents (outside the United Kingdom), because the bulk of higher education in India is in English.

Intranational disparities in income, wealth, and other indicators in India are comparable to those between EU countries, with the most extreme gaps being in the 2-3X range, except for a few very small and highly prosperous states (Sikkim in the case of India, Luxembourg in the case of the European Union). Compare the list of Indian states by GDP and list of European countries by GDP (PPP) per capita. (This post by my co-blogger Hansjoerg Walther might also be of interest). In the European Union, the most prosperous countries are in the northwest (UK, France, Germany) and the Nordic area (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark). In India, Punjab in the north is relatively prosperous due to agriculture, and the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and the southern states are prosperous due to a mix of proximity to sea ports and a relatively more educated and modern population. The poorest states are the north-eastern states, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and others in the central part of India.

I’m not aware of research that attempts to compute place premia within India, but my guess is that they’d be somewhat but not much narrower than the gaps in GDP per capita. In other words, I do think that skill differences account for part of the wage difference, but the huge scale of internal migration (discussed later in this post) suggests that people do see wage gains upon migrating.

It’s more truly open borders than China

The Chinese government has heavily restricted migration in a fairly systematic way for quite some time via the Hukou system, although they seem to be relaxing these controls. In India, the freedom of movement within the country is enshrined in the Constitution of India (see Fundamental Right #2 in the list of fundamental rights), and there are, to the best of my knowledge, no generic de jure or de facto legal barriers to migration. There do exist barriers to effective access to welfare state privileges associated with residency, and access to some government services and privately provided services is hindered due to a lack of knowledge of the regional language (particularly so for people who lack fluency in English and even more so for people who don’t know Hindi either) — more on this later in the post. But as far as the physical act of movement and relocation goes, “open borders” is certainly the right term. It’s not different in any meaningful way from freedom of movement between the member states of the United States.

Border relations with nearby countries

India has open borders with two of its land neighbors, Nepal (more here) and Bhutan. Relations with other neighbors are somewhat more hostile: Pakistan and India have tense relations largely due to disputes over Kashmir. India also shares a border with China, Bangladesh, and Burma (Myanmar) but does not have open borders with any of them. Tibet, which is close to India, has also sent many refugees to India.

India is physically close to Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is a short distance over water from the southern tip of India. Relations with Sri Lanka have been tense and have fluctuated over the years (long story).

Anyway, with the exception of Nepal and Bangladesh, none of the other countries have sent significant numbers of migrants to India, either in absolute terms or as a fraction of their populations, nor have Indians emigrated to these countries in great numbers. So for the most part, India is a closed system with internal open borders but little human interchange with the nearby world. There is emigration to faraway places (skilled emigration to the First World, plus some emigration to the Gulf States and other parts of the world) but a discussion of that gets us too far afield.

Secession movements in India

How has India managed to survive as a single country for so long? That’s a puzzle with perhaps no satisfactory answer. There have been a number of separatist movements. See this Wikipedia page for more information. None of the movements have continued for a very long time, and the grievances expressed in the movements have usually been either suppressed or accommodated through “keyhole solutions” (such as carving out a separate smaller state for the aggrieved parties, allowing for official recognition of their language, etc.). Some of the nationhood demands may well have been ambit claims, though I don’t have enough subject matter knowledge to be definitive.

The main exception is Kashmir, where a non-negligible fraction of the population has been interested in seceding from India for a considerable length of time, some of them desiring independence and others wanting Kashmir to join Pakistan. Pakistan too has had a vested interest in Kashmir. Kashmir’s accession to India was accomplished via the decisions of an unelected ruler and a popular political leader back in 1947, but the decision may not have had strong support on the ground, and Pakistan’s government has had a vested interest in helping foment dissatisfaction against the Indian government.

With the exception of Kashmir and smaller movements in the North-East, secession movements have not been active in India of late. I expect that if India’s economic growth continues apace, popular support for secession will continue to fall, as people prefer access to a wider economy over forming a nation better suited to their ethnic self-concept.

A single state with open borders versus the benefits of many different competing states

I’m somewhat sympathetic to the ideas of federalism and subsidiarity — rather than having a single government catering to a large population, it’s better to have many smaller governments catering to smaller populations. This allows for more experimentation (e.g., Tiebout competition). But, in the world as it stands today, the fragmentation into smaller governments comes at a huge cost: the states inevitably put migration restrictions and trade tariffs, leading to economic inefficiency. Whether the benefits of “letting a thousand nations bloom” outweigh the costs of restricted trade and migration is a difficult question. In the case of India, my guess is that:

  • India’s overall prosperity would be lower (perhaps comparable with Pakistan or Bangladesh, though probably a bit better) if it had split up into multiple nation-states that had peaceful relations but imposed restrictions on trade and migration with each other.
  • There would be more variation between the economic regions of India. I expect that the most prosperous states of India would probably do about as well as the most prosperous states of India do today, but the least prosperous would do considerably worse. It’s possible, though, that politics would have moved somewhat differently, and some states would have done better as independent states. There is more uncertainty at the level of individual states.
  • There would be a higher probability of a few impressive success stories, i.e., countries with income levels similar to Mexico or Malaysia, under a split. But I don’t think any particular region of India could predict with high probability that that particular region would take off as a success story, so in expectation, I still think most regions would be better off staying as part of India.

Of course, in principle, there is no conflict between having separate nation-states and having open borders and free trade, and my intuition is that this might well be optimal, but the option is currently not really on the table. One possible move in that direction, without sacrificing national unity, would be to move towards shifting more responsibilities to the states rather than the central (federal) government. This is unlikely to happen because the manner of separation of duties is specified in the Constitution, and currently heavily favors the central government, even giving it precedence on items that are in a joint list (the Concurrent List).

Migration within India

There is a fair amount of internal migration in India, though the data isn’t of sufficiently high quality to judge how well it fits with economic models. The Migration Policy Institute article titled Internal Labor Migration in India Raises Integration Challenges for Migrants by Rameez Abbas and Divya Varma offers an excellent overview of what’s known, and includes references to other online and offline material on the subject. The following are some highlights:

  • A huge amount of intranational migration is rural-to-urban migration. Unsurprisingly, the states with the most rural populations (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar) are the states that send the most migrants to other states.
  • In general, migration flows seem to go from states with lower per capita income to states with higher per capita income, and the same phenomenon is observed for intra-state migration. But this is closely related to the phenomenon of migration being rural-to-urban.
  • The 2001 census recorded 191 million people who had migrated to a faraway district or different state. This was 20% of the population at the time. About 70% of internal migrants were women, and their main motive for migration was marriage. Males who migrated were largely motivated by economic reasons (looking for jobs). The total proportion of migrants is close to 30% but this also includes people who migrate short distances to nearby places. (This UNICEF report from 2012 also gives the 30% figure).
  • A large fraction of labor migration is short-term migration. The migrants are generally not highly skilled, but it’s unclear how their skill level compares with the population as a whole, given that the Indian population in general is not highly skilled. Most labor migrants are employed in a few key subsectors, including construction, domestic work, textile and brick manufacturing, transportation, mining and quarrying, and agriculture.

The article identifies the following challenges for migrants:

  • Documentation and identity: Migrants often lack appropriate documents to establish their identity and establish residency and therefore have trouble accessing both government-provided and privately provided services.
  • Housing: Migrants typically live in slums in conditions that are often more crowded than where they came from. The informal nature of their housing adds to the challenge of establishing residency necessary for accessing various services.
  • Limited access to formal financial services: We’ll discuss this more in part 2.
  • Political exclusion: We’ll discuss this more in part 2.
  • Rampant exploitation: We’ll discuss this more in part 2.

Stay tuned for part 2, where I’ll look more closely at local attitudes to migration, the economic data on migrant performance, as well as episodes with unusually high levels of immigration and emigration for specific regions, usually in the wake of natural or man-made disasters.

A conceptual framework for empirical analysis of migration (introduction)

Is migration good or bad for indicator X (here, X could be wages, employment levels, self-reported happiness, crime, welfare state use, moral virtue, etc.)? The question, as posed, is ill-defined. The ambiguity could arise from different meanings or interpretations of indicator X. But there’s also considerable ambiguity in the “Is migration good or bad” part of the question. Good or bad for whom? Compared to what?

I was moved to write this post series after an aborted attempt at trying to synthesize what different people had said about the effects of migration. Often, the people were talking past each other, measuring slightly different things. There’s a question of what we should measure, i.e., what measurement is the most appropriate one. But a first step is knowing that it’s possible to be measuring many different things. This post series attempts to clarify the range of things one could be measuring and how they relate to one another.

The series is structured as follows:

  1. Part 1: direct empirical measurement focuses on something that can be computed through direct empirical measurement: the performance of people who stay put in their countries, and the performance of people who migrate from one country to another.
  2. Part 2: comparative statics, multiple matrices discusses how to compare different policy regimes or scenarios for migration. Such comparisons typically involve counterfactuals and cannot be settled completely by empirical data: we need a model, and there’s considerable model uncertainty even if the data is excellent.
  3. Part 3: simplified model assuming no changes to non-migrants considers a simplified situation where we assume that migration at the margin primarily affects migrants and not the natives of either sending or receiving countries. The question is then about how migrants fare relative to the counterfactual where they are not allowed to, or were unable to, migrate. We’ll consider rank-ordering and quantitative comparison of natives of the source country, natives of the target country, potential migrants if they can migrate, and potential migrants if they cannot migrate.
  4. Part 4: Models for migrant performance considers different models for how migrant performance might be predictable in terms of the performance of the source and target countries.
  5. Part 5 discusses the descendants of migrants, and in particular the interaction with diaspora dynamics.
  6. Part 6 wraps up by considering some subtleties that were omitted in the preceding discussion.

The series also includes a number of minor mathematical digressions. If you have a reasonable background in mathematics (up to basic calculus and linear algebra, to the level generally needed for social scientists) you should be able to follow these. But you can otherwise skip the mathematical digressions without loss of continuity.

Choice of analytical focus

Despite the bewildering array of possibilities we’ll consider, there’s a high chance that the model used in the series will remain wanting. We’ll defer a detailed (but still partial!) discussion of the shortcomings to part 6, but a few preliminary remarks might be helpful.

A broad remark worth making is that the analysis in the coming parts will focus heavily on the migrant’s country of origin/birth (the “source country”) as well as the migrant’s country of current residence (the “target country”). We’ll also consider the distinction between migrants and non-migrants. This suggests that there are only three important components to the person’s identity that carry importance in statistical aggregation: the source country, the target country, and whether the person is a migrant. While other attributes can vary, we’re not interested in using them as the basis for grouping, since we’re aggregating over them.

But the reality is more complicated. Religious and ethnic identities can be subnational or supranational. Lebanese Muslims and Lebanese Christians may be best viewed as separate groups (though there are some cultural similarities and they’re probably genetically close to identical). In the United States, the Native Americans (American Indians) may be better viewed as a separate subgroup. On the other hand, sometimes it may be better to consider ethnic or ideological groupings that cut across national lines, such as Scandinavian, Western European, Anglo-American, Arab Muslim, Sunni Mulim, Shia Muslim, sub-Saharan African, Hindu, or ethnically Chinese.

The reason for our singular focus on nationality is simply that immigration law as it currently stands gives extreme importance to national boundaries and national membership. It may be ironic that, on a website devoted to critiquing the existing global regime of borders and migration controls, and the rigidity of national identity enforced by laws, a series of blog posts so meekly follows the status quo. My only excuse is that one needs to start somewhere. But you should feel free to fill in your own variations of the ideas based on forms of identity that do not coincide with one’s place of birth and one’s current residence, rather than wait to get to part 6.

Where’s the data?

As I go over different aspects of the model, you might be tempted to ask: can one actually construct the data that’s needed to do the quantitative comparisons and answer the various questions I pose? Data does exist for some things but not for others. The data for the model discussed in part 1 is relatively good. For the model in part 2, there is considerable model uncertainty, so rather than standardized data, we generally have to rely on individual pieces of research that attack specific instances. Often, the absence of data will illustrate the underlying point, namely, that obtaining clear answers to some questions is hard. It’s best to view this conceptual framework more as a tool to encourage clear thinking than as something in which we can plug in numerical values and answer questions.

If you’re interested in learning about existing data sets on migration, take a look at the migration information web resources page on this website.

Open borders between hostile nations

This blog post is an expanded version of a comment I posted on the Open Borders Action Group. It’s about whether hostile nations can or should have open borders, and how close a world would be to open borders if countries had open borders for all countries except those where they had nation-to-nation hostility.

In principle, one might say that having open borders with all countries except the few that the nation is officially hostile to is almost as good as having complete open borders. In most cases, a given nation is hostile to only one or two other nations, so curtailing the freedom to move to those specific nations is not that big an imposition. After all, if two nations with populations of a hundred million each closed their borders only to each other, that still leaves the residents of each nation access to the remaining ~7 billion of the world’s population and over 90% of the world economy. Isn’t that close enough to open borders?

In practice, though, countries with hostile relations aren’t random pairings — often the hostile relations are linked with shared cultural elements, a common language, family ties across the border, and interest in specific geographic locations. This is partly because hostilities arise from war, secession, or controversial historical reconfigurations of boundaries that failed to account for realities on the ground, often because it’s intrinsically impossible (see here, here, and here for more on how borders have been drawn historically around the world). Thus, cutting off people’s access to the hostile nation is a disproportionately large imposition relative to what the population sizes alone would suggest.

Now, it could still be argued that in some cases, the existential threat of free movement is so severe that, unfortunate as it is, free migration between the hostile nations cannot be permitted. But, as with many arguments to close borders, such arguments should be examined critically and appropriate keyhole solutions worked out wherever possible.

An additional point: looking at the most challenging situations for open borders can help us test the limits of the strength of the case for open borders. It can help explain just how far we believe the right to migrate stretches, and just where people who claim to be open borders advocates draw the line. I carried out a similar exercise earlier when considering denial of migration for people based on their criminal records.

Special dangers

Special benefits

High levels of cultural exchange, family ties, and commercial interaction give people in both countries vested interests in the preservation and safety of members of the other country. Free migration and free trade can facilitate these and make the world safer and more prosperous.

It’s not clear whether government leaders want these benefits. Those who derive their power from aggressive hawkish stances may find their authority undermined by friendly ties with hostile neighbors. But not all politicians fit this category. Further, politicians can sometimes combine hawkish rhetoric with the promotion of cultural interchange, getting the best of both worlds: the economic and cultural benefits and the support of people who care about national pride.

Temporary diplomatic standoffs

In cases where nations have temporary diplomatic standoffs over the actions of national leaders that don’t necessarily have popular support in either country, it doesn’t make sense to curtail migration — it’s highly unlikely that individuals in the country bear each other much ill-will. Ending free movement might turn a temporary standoff into long-term rivalry. Examples of such temporary standoffs arise when a government in one country clandestinely (often without the knowledge or support of its own citizens) supports a rebel faction, or an incumbent who eventually gets deposed, during infighting in the other country. The focus in this post is not on such instances but rather on cases where there seem to be enduring feuds based on long-term grievances. This article on how the West should respond to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine makes a similar point.

Some examples

The following are some examples of hostile nations that may be considered tough cases for the open borders paradigm:

  • North Korea and South Korea: This example is perhaps too unusual, because the main constraint here is not immigration restrictions but emigration restrictions put in place by North Korea. For more on North Korea, see here.
  • India and Pakistan: The countries were created as a result of the 1947 Partition of India, with a lot of bloodshed accompanying the creation. There is considerable mutual hostility over the disputed territory of Kashmir. More on India and Pakistan in a separate blog post. You can also get a good historical primer on the countries here.
  • Israel and Palestine: This is a highly asymmetric situation in many ways. Israel is internationally recognized and has considerably greater military might. Palestine is not internationally recognized and does not have a strong government, but there have been many suicide terrorists from the area attacking locations in Israel. We hope to write more, but for now, you might want to check out this post.
  • Russia and its neighbors (Ukraine, Georgia): There are land disputes between Russia and some of its neighbors, due to inherently contested boundaries. You might want to check out co-blogger Nathan Smith’s post, and we hope to write more about these issues later. This article (also linked from the temporary diplomatic standoffs section of the post) has an interesting relevant quote:

    Georgian policy towards Putin is a good example, I think. The Georgian government abolished visas for Russian tourists in spite of the tough relations between the two countries. Lots of Russians had an opportunity to see with their own eyes what was really happening in Georgia and how the market-oriented anti-corruption reforms affected the society.

  • Armenia and Azerbaijan: There may be more about these countries on our blog later. Some good articles to read are here, here, and here.
  • China and Taiwan: We’ll have more about this pair of countries on our blog later. Some good initial articles to read are here, here, here, here, and here.

There are many other examples of countries that have disputes over specific territories. There are also some examples of intranational borders to keep competing factions within a country from attacking or getting into conflicts with each other. Examples include the peace line in Northern Ireland and the green line in Lebanon.

We hope to explore these situations in greater depth in future blog posts. Any other examples of hostile nations worth discussing? Any historical examples? Any general considerations I missed in my opening remarks above?

Factors constraining migration in the short run following significant migration liberalization

A while back, I posted in Open Borders Action Group the following question:

What do you think would be the critical factor constraining migration rates in the short run if migration policy were significantly liberalized?

and offered a list of possibilities to begin with. Commenters rated the possibilities and added a few more. I have tried to combine the wisdom offered by different commentators and will list the possibilities in decreasing order of importance as per the combined wisdom. The numbering is not the same as in the original OBAG post, but I parenthetically include the original numbers for comparison.

Note that this post isn’t based on a direct analysis of empirical data. That would take too much time and space. I’m planning to have more posts with detailed discussions of particular cases, such as the Mariel boatlift and German reunification. Note that neither of these fits the template too well, because these involve emigration push factors more than liberalization pull factors. If you have other suggestions or historical instances of sudden influxes of migrants based on migration liberalization or for other reasons, do share them in the comments.

A little more context: there are many different views regarding how many would move under migration liberalization. One view is that receiving countries will be swamped. Another extreme is that migration policy has little effect on migration rates (this is a crude simplication of some economic determinist views). Both views present problems for advocates of open borders: the former suggests that it would overwhelm the world, while the latter suggests that there wouldn’t be sufficient migration to realize the huge potential economic gains from migrating.

Bryan Caplan recently pointed out that Paul Collier’s diaspora dynamics model helps resolve the contradiction in a manner that doesn’t look too bad for open borders: migration rates are slow initially, and pick up gradually. This post considers more closely what factors affect the initial migration flow after significant liberalization.

#1: Jobs (was #4 in the original list)

Economic opportunity is a primary reason for people migrating. That doesn’t necessarily mean they will go to the place with the highest-paying jobs, but they’re highly unlikely to move if they (or their family members) don’t expect to find a job that’s at least somewhat better than what they currently have. One reason why migration has such huge promised benefits is that people can move to jobs where they produce more and earn more, thanks to a place premium.

However, it takes time for new jobs to be created. For instance, factory jobs require the factory to be constructed first. Even for job types with low capital costs (such as janitorial services), natives or existing migrants need to set up the services first before others can confidently expect to find employment.

In addition to the fixed costs and time lag of creating jobs (in anticipation of the larger number of migrants who would fill those jobs), there are also regulatory barriers that prevent people from taking up certain kinds of jobs immediately upon moving. If these barriers were relaxed, people might be able to move more quickly. Else, they may need to first arrange for appropriate training or licensing programs to pass the licensing restrictions needed to practice the trade.

#2: Presence of friends and connections in the target country (diaspora dynamics) (was #8 in the original list)

People rarely want to move if they don’t know anybody where they are going. Paul Collier’s analysis of diaspora dynamics notes that migration between two regions starts as a trickle, and, if initial migrants report positive experiences, then it starts building up. In addition to the informational value, people also have better legal, social, and cultural support structures once a diaspora from their homeland has already settled in the new country.

#3: Bureaucracy (was #7 in the original list)

Even after a government announces significantly more liberal migration, the implementation of the policy on the ground would probably take time. New embassies or consulates would be needed to process the larger numbers of visa applications. Other government departments that screen migrants for criminal or terrorist risk would need to be expanded. The legislative changes would take time to be translated into new administrative procedures. This would add delays ranging from several months to several years, depending on how big the changes are.

#4: Housing (was #1 in the original list)

New migrants need a place to stay. Construction of housing has a significant lag time, ranging from at least a few months to a few years, depending on the location. This relates to the bureaucracy point: much of the delay in housing construction can be attributed to delays with getting permits, though the time cost of physically constructing new houses is also nontrivial.

Housing may not be a big issue if migrants can squeeze into existing housing more. I expect that many potential migrants would be willing to live (at least in the short run, while new housing is still being constructed) in crowded housing conditions in order to benefit from the greater earning power in the new country. However, existing laws against overcrowding might again get in the way. Since these regulations tend to be local, however, it’s possible to imagine that, under more liberal migration policies, some cities that are particularly keen to attract migrants will loosen their regulations to encourage such migration, even if others continue to maintain regulation that forbids overcrowding.

#5: Arranging money for the moves, and closing shop in the home country (was #5 in the original list)

The significance of this factor depends to quite an extent on the population segment for which migration is liberalized. Poor potential migrants would probably need some time to arrange for their moves, because they are cash-constrained. They may need to borrow money from existing lenders. Or, new lending arrangements specifically tied to the liberalized migration policy might emerge. This could take several months. High-skilled migrants may not be cash-constrained, but they may have a harder time closing shop in their home country. Those pursuing educational degrees may wait till their degree is completed. Those in a job may need to give a few months’ notice to their employers. People may need to figure out whether and how to dispose of their current real estate and other assets.

#6: Roads and transit infrastructure (was #6 in the original list)

Transportation infrastructure is a major determinant of where people choose to live now, and it will be a determinant of migration flows. The density of roads as well as other transportation infrastructure (such as railway lines) puts limits on the densities sustainable in a region.

This may not be a big factor if migrants can easily move to relatively underpopulated rural areas. But mass migration is likely to be spurred by large numbers of factory or service jobs in dense urban regions, and these do depend on development of transportation infrastructure. Moreover, existing diasporas from their homeland (such as Chinatowns or Little Italies) are most likely to be found in dense urban regions.

#7: Housing utilities infrastructure: electricity, water, and cooking gas (was #2 in the original list)

If native use levels of housing utilities remained unchanged, and migrants were expected to use them at the same rate as natives, then the infrastructure would need considerable expansion before people could migrate. However, I expect that, at least initially, migrants would use considerably less of the infrastructure than natives do. Further, short-run price increases in infrastructure can discourage use at the margin — there’s considerable scope to cut back on the use of electricity and water that people don’t bother implementing because the cost is too little. Resources such as water and electricity are also used heavily by agriculture and industry, and they can cut back on the use of these with rising prices. Moreover, the costs of electricity are determined by the costs of fuels (petroleum, natural gas, coal). Enough of these are traded in a global market that people moving from one region to another will not increase the relevant demand too much in the short run (though demand would increase over the longer run as these people become more prosperous and assimilate into First World levels of fuel use). Finally, some of the housing utility costs scale with the number of households rather than the number of individuals, so if migrants live in more crowded housing, and/or the higher housing prices encourage natives as well to switch to more crowded housing, the overall increase in the use of utilities is even lower.

#8: Physical transportation of migrants to their new lands (was #3 in the original list)

This is arguably the least important, because the fraction of travel currently devoted to long-term migration is fairly small (1-10%) of international travel. Much international travel involves business trips, people visiting friends and relatives, and vacation trips. If a lot more people seek to permanently migrate, that would raise international travel costs somewhat, and dissuade some people from going on vacation trips or visiting friends and relatives. Some people may teleconference instead of making an international business trip. We don’t need an expansion in the number of flights in the short term, though that will probably happen over the longer term. The time taken for people to get visas and to arrange money for their moves is probably more than the lag time involved with flight booking.

Flights may be too expensive for some potential migrants. It’s also possible that ship-based transportation will be able to take care of some of these migrants. Currently, ships are not used for people traveling long distances, but this is largely because most such people value their time a lot higher than the extra cost of traveling by air. If air travel gets too expensive, or if the people traveling care more about cost than time, then cheap, ship-based travel will emerge. It’ll probably be intermediate in quality (and cost) between the ships used to transport people in the 19th century to Ellis Island and the luxury cruise liners of today.