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What open borders advocates and scholars of migration and development can teach each other

I’ve recently been reading the scholarly literature on migration and development. In this blog post, I attempt to summarize my understanding of important ways in which researchers in the area are similar to and important ways that they differ from open borders advocates. Then, I’ll discuss what I think both sides can learn from each other.

For examples of the sort of things I’ve been reading, consider this 2007 report for the Department for International Development in the UK, this article on labor migration in India, the World Bank People Move blog, and the websites of KNOMAD and Migrating out of Poverty.

Who are the migration and development scholars who’ve explicitly endorsed radically freer migration?

Some scholars of migration and development are quite sympathetic to the logic of open borders, want the world to move as far as possible in that direction, and explicitly say so. One example is Michael Clemens. While he has expressed some terminological disagreement with “open borders” as a term, he accepts the basic moral logic, he’s all for the main aspects of open borders, and he supports moving as far in that direction as is feasible. Clemens is a co-creator of the place premium and income per natural concepts. He has raised the status in the economic development community of the idea that development is about people, not places. And he wrote the paper that prompted Bryan Caplan to come up with the double world GDP slogan. Note that Clemens isn’t famous solely as a migration researcher; he has also been at the forefront of critiquing some aspects of the Millennium Villages Project.

Another migration scholar who’s expressed considerable sympathy for the open borders position is Lant Pritchett. Pritchett co-authored the place premium paper with Clemens, and has also written a book advocating for freer migration. Pritchett is a renowned development economist who has done considerable work on many areas unrelated to migration, including the return to schooling worldwide and the relation between desired and actual fertility and the importance of contraception to fertility reduction.

How has the community of development scholars changed its views on migration?

I haven’t been able to get a very clear picture, but it seems to me that the international development community as a whole used to be more hostile to migration as a poverty reduction strategy, but they are now more open to it. The following are some general observations:

  • Brain drain was considered a major argument against migration among development scholars, but the balance of the evidence in recent years has moved scholars to the view that the problem is not severe, with many scholars believing that brain circulation and idea flows can be beneficial on net.
  • Historically, the dominant view in the international development community has been similar to the view of many mainstream moderate pro-immigration people that John Lee described here, namely, that migration is not natural, that barriers to it are natural, and that removing migration barriers creates an artificial subsidy encouraging people to move. They’ve also taken the view that suggesting migration as a solution to poverty is essentially a cop-out that accepts defeat in tackling the harder problem of how to get countries to develop. These views again seem to be declining somewhat. It’s more common now for development scholars to consider migration a legitimate part of a strategy that can facilitate improvements in the living conditions of people who migrate and people who stay behind.
  • Dilip Ratha’s work on remittances (see also this New York Times article) got people more interested in the idea that migration can benefit the people who are left behind. Robert Guest’s book on the importance of diasporas encapsulates the growing recognition among migration scholars of how migration can benefit people everywhere, not just those who migrate.

Some other people weighed in on the topic on the comments on this post on the Open Borders Action Group on Facebook.

How do the mainstream migration and development scholars differ from open borders advocates in their views and in their rhetorical emphasis?

In general, mainstream scholars of migration and development are quite similar to the mainstream moderate pro-immigration people John Lee described. In some respects, however, the scholars of migration and development come closer to the open borders position. In particular, compared to mainstream pro-immigration people, and perhaps even compared to some open borders advocates, they differ in these respects:

  • They have a clearer understanding of what poverty and wealth mean, and how rich and poor people are in different parts of the world. And they confront these facts on a regular basis in their work, so it’s harder for them to simply brush these under the carpet. Even somebody like Paul Collier, who wrote the book Exodus that took a lukewarm stance to migration, showed clear understanding and concern about just how big the differences in living standards are.
  • Even if they don’t use the term, they understand the concept of the place premium — the idea that an individual can improve his or her earnings just by crossing borders, with no change in skills, and that much of this improvement is attributable to differences in the value of what the person produces rather than a result of labor legislation or government redistribution.
  • They understand that governments often pander to nativist, citizenist, and territorialist sentiments to an extent that goes beyond what they think is morally appropriate, and also that the sentiments they are pandering to often rely on misguided economic logic. They themselves personally lean more universalist, sometimes in the additive utilitarian sense, sometimes in the egalitarian sense.
  • Even if they’re not themselves libertarians, the libertarian argument in favor of the right to migrate is something that stands out to them more than it does to moderate pro-immigration folks who haven’t thought much about international development. To them, it’s not just an armchair hypothetical. They are also aware of arguments based on human capabilities, even if they haven’t encountered the explicit framework.

On the other hand, they still differ from us “tear down the borders” folks:

  • Their more laser-like focus on poverty alleviation can make them seem somewhat lacking in moral qualms as they discuss issues of optimal migration policy, even when they favor freer migration.
  • Even when they do favor dismantling border controls or other regulations, they’ll frame it in language that suggests more government management of migration. For instance, a concrete recommendation like “get rid of Know Your Customer regulations that forbid migrants from opening bank accounts” would be framed as “facilitate migrant access to banking through reform in Know Your Customer regulations.”
  • Many of their recommendations are focused on strengthening existing patterns of migration that already exist, rather than on loosening border controls that could facilitate new patterns of migration. This may be partly because they’re too anchored to the status quo to consider radical changes. More defensibly, diaspora dynamics suggests that it’s easier to facilitate the expansion of existing migration patterns than create new ones.
  • Related to the preceding, migration and development scholars are a lot more focused on intranational migration as well as international migration among low-income countries and between low-income and middle-income countries.
  • For policy questions, migration and development scholars concentrate their energies on thinking about how to tweak existing systems rather than coming up with new systems from scratch (such as DRITI).
  • Migration and development scholars are very focused on other aspects of the welfare of migrants that are not directly related to open borders. These include migrant childrens’ access to schools, migrants’ access to government-provided and private sector services, and facilitation of communication between migrants and their relatives back home.

What can open borders advocates learn from migration scholars?

Here are some things I believe open borders advocates should learn from migration scholars:

  • More attention to the actual experiences of poor people who migrate: Open borders isn’t purely about poor people, and in particular I believe that there will be a strong imperative for open borders even in a world without poverty. But certainly, freer migration should be an important part of the toolkit to end poverty, and the current state of world poverty considerably raises the importance of the issue. To the extent that open borders advocates are interested in the issue not just theoretically but at a practical level, a closer empirical look at how poor people fare under migration is warranted. Migration and development scholars spend a large part of their life thinking about poverty, and we can be inspired to spend at least a few hours on it.
  • More focus on intranational migration, migration between low-income countries, and migration from low-income to middle-income countries: Open borders advocacy can sometimes seem like too much speculation about something that doesn’t exist at all. And to an extent, that’s right: open borders across a huge place premium (of 5X or more) hasn’t happened. But it might be worth looking at the huge amount of migration that already exists and understanding its implications. While still arguing morally for open borders worldwide, we can focus more on understanding what already exists and making changes to it. Often, there is little reliable data and little interest among readers in such matters (such as Nepal and India, or North Korean refugees), simply because blog readers are highly likely to be in First World countries and are more aware of First World issues. But I think that pushing more in the direction of better understanding migration as it’s actually happening is worthwhile, even if it doesn’t make us popular. We can be inspired here by migration scholars, who have worked very hard to compile data and collect anecdotes to further the world’s understanding of migration.

What can migration scholars learn from open borders advocates?

I think migration scholars can also take a few lessons from open borders advocates:

  • The moral case for free migration matters. It’s the foundation of everything else. Make the case boldly wherever possible.
  • It helps to consider the radical proposal that is open borders, and ask just how far one can get there. Bold policy changes can be useful to consider, even if they aren’t possible to directly implement. It’s not good to stay anchored to the present all the time.
  • When advocating for reductions in government restrictions on migration, it may make sense to not obfuscate this with the “more government management of migration” language. Further, in cases where the optimal policy comes very close to complete deregulation, consider advocating complete principled deregulation instead of trying to target the specific optimal policy. Complete principled deregulation, even if not optimal on paper, leaves less room for governments to re-institute the counterproductive controls seen in current policy.

The photograph of an open borders campaigner at the top of this post was taken by Jonathan McIntosh at a rally in Los Angeles, California, and is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution licence.

A conceptual framework for empirical analysis of migration (part 2: comparative statics, multiple matrices)

This post is part 2 of a series outlining a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of migration. Read the introductory post to the series here and part 1 here.

The questions discussed in this post are often difficult or impossible to resolve empirically, because one or more of the scenarios being compared is counterfactual. Techniques used include comparison of different time periods or different regimes. Regression analysis may be used to isolate the relevant factors. Conclusions drawn here are suspect even if the data collected is impeccable, because the theoretical model used for analysis may be invalid.

The simplest form of comparison is to consider the indicator values for various (source country, target country) pairs under the different possible migration policy regimes, and compare corresponding indicator values between the two regimes. For instance, how do French natives who stay in France under the pre-EU migration policy regime compare with French natives who stay in France under the EU migration policy regime?

Mathematical digression: multiple matrices

The earlier static framework considered a single matrix that encapsulated information on the performance of migrants as well as people who stay put for various source and target countries. Now, we’re trying to compare different scenarios. Now, each scenario has its own matrix. Our goal then is to compare the entry in one matrix with the corresponding entry in another matrix. In some cases, what we’re interested in is not a single entry, but a weighted average, or ratio, or difference, of entries. We then compute and compare that expression for the different countries.

For instance, consider the three-country scenario with France, Germany and the UK again (from part 1). Now, consider two policy regimes: the pre-EU regime and the EU regime. These are qualitatively different regimes: in the former, migration between the countries is not completely free, so there are stronger selection effects for migrants. Therefore, the matrices for the two regimes are probably different.

Suppose the matrix with the pre-EU regime is as follows (the superscript $latex {}^o$ is not an exponent, but indicates that the matrix refers to indicator values under the old policy regime):

$latex \begin{pmatrix} x^o_{11} & x^o_{12} & x^o_{13} \\ x^o_{21} & x^o_{22} & x^o_{23} \\ x^o_{31} & x^o_{32} & x^o_{33} \\\end{pmatrix}$

and the matrix with the EU regime is as follows (the superscript $latex {}^n$ is not an exponent, but indicates that the matrix refers to indicator values under the new policy regime):

$latex \begin{pmatrix} x^n_{11} & x^n_{12} & x^n_{13} \\ x^n_{21} & x^n_{22} & x^n_{23} \\ x^n_{31} & x^n_{32} & x^n_{33} \\\end{pmatrix}$

We can then compare the entries. For instance:

  • The comparison of $latex x^o_{11}$ and $latex x^n_{11}$ reveals how the French who stay in France under the pre-EU regime compare with the French who stay in France under the EU regime.
  • The comparison of $latex x^o_{12}$ and $latex x^n_{12}$ reveals how the people from France and in Germany under the pre-EU regime compare with the people from France and in Germany under the EU regime.
  • The comparison of $latex x^o_{13}$ and $latex x^n_{13}$ reveals how the people from France and in the UK under the pre-EU regime compare with the people from France and and in Germany under the EU regime.

End mathematical digression

Note that any such comparison between different policy regimes has two components:

  • Selection effect: The set of people in each of the categories is different under the two regimes. In particular, people who might not have been able to migrate under the pre-EU regime can migrate under the EU regime. Thus, even if the indicator value is the same between the two regimes for every individual (i.e., the changes to migration patterns don’t actually affect how any individual performs on the indicator), the difference in the labels means a different matrix for the two regimes.
  • Treatment effect: The marginal migrants under the new policy experience changes relative to what they would have if they had stayed put, and they may also influence the indicator values for the people who stay put, or the others who would have migrated under the old regime as well.

Separating the selection and treatment effects requires us to consider separate matrices of indicator values using groupings from one regime, but measurements from the other regime. For instance, we ask: how do the people who would have stayed in France under the EU migration policy regime fare under the non-EU migration policy regime? We then compare these matrices to the matrices where the grouping and performance are measured for the same regime.

Mathematical digression: the matrices that use grouping and indicator values from different regimes

We continue with our three-country representation: country 1 (France), country 2 (Germany) and country 3 (the UK). Recall that the superscript $latex {}^o$ was used for the old policy regime (the pre-EU regime) and the superscript $latex {}^n$ was used for the new policy regime. We now consider some new matrices that can be constructed in principle but are hard to measure because they require a mix of information about two policy regimes.

Consider the matrix that uses grouping from the EU regime but indicator values from the pre-EU regime, denoted with superscript $latex {}^{n,o}$.

$latex \begin{pmatrix} x^{n,o}_{11} & x^{n,o}_{12} & x^{n,o}_{13} \\ x^{n,o}_{21} & x^{n,o}_{22} & x^{n,o}_{23} \\ x^{n,o}_{31} & x^{n,o}_{32} & x^{n,o}_{33} \\\end{pmatrix}$

The matrix is interpreted as follows: it represents the average values of the indicators under the pre-EU regime but using the groupings under the EU regime. For instance, the entry $latex x^{n,o}_{12}$ measures how the people who would migrate from France to Germany under the EU regime fare under the pre-EU regime. We can similarly consider another matrix with entries denoted $latex x^{o,n}$ that uses the groupings from the pre-EU regime but the indicator values from the EU regime. Entry comparisons between the four matrices reveal different types of information. The various combinations are discussed below:

  • A direct comparison of $latex x^o$ and $latex x^n$ is comparing different regimes, using the grouping for each regime when considering it. This incorporates both a compositional selection effect arising from the difference in grouping and the treatment effect arising from a different set of people being able to migrate, affecting themselves and others.
  • The comparison of $latex x^n$ and $latex x^{n,o}$ isolates for the treatment effect using the grouping of the new regime.
  • The comparison of $latex x^n$ and $latex x^{o,n}$ isolates for the selection effect using the grouping of the new regime.
  • The comparison of $latex x^o$ and $latex x^{o,n}$ isolates for the treatment effect using the grouping of the old regime.
  • The comparison of $latex x^o$ and $latex x^{n,o}$ isolates for the selection effect using the grouping of the old regime.

End mathematical digression

Changes in weights

The number of migrants, as well as the number of non-migrants, differs under the various policy regimes. Therefore, the weights needed to take a weighted average (when computing average indicators — “per natural” for people born in a country or “per resident” for people living in a country) differ between the policy regimes.

Mathematical digression

The choice of weights depends on the grouping, so $latex x^n$ and $latex x^{n,o}$ use the same weights as each other, whereas $latex x^o$ and $latex x^{o,n}$ use the same weights as each other, but different from the other two.

End mathematical digression

Same set of people in the two regimes?

One of the points we’ve elided somewhat in our framing above is that we’re assuming that the set of people is the same in both regimes, and in fact, that the set of naturals for each country (i.e., the set of people with that source country) is the same in both regimes. What differs between the regimes is what country they land up in (the compositional selection effect) and how this affects the value of the indicator for them (the treatment effect).

But the assumption that the set of people itself is the same doesn’t actually hold water. People have children, and their decision of whether or not to migrate affects the identity and affiliation of the children. It might also affect how many children they have. Similarly, people may die, and migration policies may affect how long people live. We’re abstracting away from these issues for now, but will return to them in parts 5 and 6, before we start applying the framework in earnest to real-world migration questions.

Different normative perspectives

The individualist utilitarian universalist perspective is concerned with the weighted average of the indicator over the whole matrix for the two different policy regimes.

Once we leave the utilitarian universalist perspective, however, we have a bewildering array of normative choices. There are three big dimensions to the normative choices:

  1. The dimension of what particular indicator or weighted combination of indicators we care about. One may care about:
    • A particular (source country, target country) combination.
    • All naturals of a country (all people with that source country, including those who stay and those who leave).
    • All residents of a country (all people with that target country, including natives and immigrants).
    • All immigrants to a country.
    • All emigrants from a country.
  2. The method used for grouping:
    • We could use, for each regime, the grouping of that regime. For instance, we could compare the performance on indicator X of the French who stay in France under the EU regime, with the performance on indicator X of the French who stay in France under the pre-EU regime. This is problematic because selection effects can lead to the compositional effects paradoxes where all individuals are better off but some indicators still get worse due to the change in grouping. Territorialism has this flavor in practice, though it could in principle be of the other type below.
    • We could privilege a particular regime to determine the grouping. For instance, we could say “I’m interested in maximizing the welfare of the set of people who would be French natives staying in France under the pre-EU regime, regardless of where they go under the EU regime.” Citizenism, though it isn’t exactly in this framework (since it favors citizenship and not necessarily birthplace) has this flavor: citizenists explicitly reject changing the idea of “who are we” in the face of new migration policy when deciding ex ante what policy regime is favorable.
  3. Whether one looks at only a single instance, or at all. For instance, we could imagine somebody who cares about French natives only, or German natives only, versus somebody who cares about “natives” as a reference class, or “whoever gets to be resident in a country” as what we’re trying to improve, for each country. This could well be universalist (if the set of things we care about encompass everybody) and yet be different from individualistic utilitarian universalism, because we care about averages for particular groupings rather than about individuals qua individuals. While these different forms of universalism often agree, they don’t always do, thanks to compositional effects paradoxes.

First-order and second-order effects

The most direct treatment effect of migration is on migrants: they move to a new place, and experience a new environment. Assuming that migrants are a relatively small share relative to both their source and target countries, this effect will dominate at a per capita level, though possibly not at the aggregate (total) level.

An indirect, second-order, treatment effect is on the natives of the sending countries and receiving countries. Migrants leave the sending countries, thereby changing the nature of the society in these countries. They enter the receiving countries. and similarly change the societies there. Effects here are likely to be small on a per capita basis, but comparable in the aggregate to the effects on migrants themselves.

Note also that individual migrants affect other migrants, because a lot of migrants interact with fellow migrants to a greater extent than would be predicted by their proportion in the population. There is some terminological ambiguity on whether to consider this a first-order or a second-order effect. On the one hand, it’s an effect directly experienced by “migrants” as a class. On the other hand, it is an effect that people’s migration has on other migrants. This idea is closely related to diaspora dynamics, and we’ll get to it somewhere in parts 5 and 6.

Crossed dependencies: how the migration policy regime of one country affects migration between other pairs of countries

When we talk of a particular policy regime or scenario, we’re talking of a particular combination of immigration and emigration policy regimes for all countries. For any given country, its own migration policy is the most relevant when considering migration flows to and from that country. But the migration policies of other countries matter too:

  • The immigration policies of countries that may receive migrants from the country, and the emigration policies of the countries that may send migrants to the country, matter.
  • The immigration policies of countries that may “compete” with the given country for migrants also matter. Similarly, the emigration policies of countries that may compete with the country for sending migrants to a third country also matter.

To complicate matters even further, migration policies of countries are often linked with each other based on reciprocity and multilateral agreements (the EU is one example; temporary visa programs around the world are another).

Policies not directly related to migration affect migration

In a sense, all policies are relevant to migration, because they affect the economic, social, and cultural indicators of the country, and these in turn affect how attractive a destination it is for potential migrants. Some policies more directly affect migrants. For instance, high minimum wage laws might deter migration from places where workers are unlikely to have sufficient skills to get jobs that command the high minimum wage.

A conceptual framework for empirical analysis of migration (part 1: direct empirical measurement)

This post is part 1 of a series outlining a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of migration. Read the introductory post to the series here. This post focuses on a particular form of comparison that can be carried out through direct empirical measurement. The questions directly answered this way aren’t the ones we are usually most interested in. But at least these are questions for which we can obtain precise answers in principle. That’s a start.

Questions about how different groups of people compare for a given regime at a given point in time (or over an interval of time) can be answered by direct empirical measurement, at least for existing regimes. They cannot be directly answered for hypothetical regimes. But the fact that they can be answered at all differentiates them from other, more speculative, questions.

(Source country, target country) pairs as the basis of aggregation

The conceptual model we use identifies two attributes of a person: the person’s source country (also known as the sending country, and defined as the country that person was born in) and the person’s target country (also known as the receiving country or recipient country, and defined as the country the person now lives in). For non-migrants, the source and target country coincide. For migrants, the source and target country differ. For every individual, therefore, we can write down a (source country, target country) pair. For instance, somebody born in Mexico who stays in Mexico gets the pair (Mexico,Mexico). Somebody born in Nepal who moves to India gets the pair (Nepal,India). (This is obviously a very crude simplified model, because some people migrate temporarily, some migrate to one country and then to another, etc. But it’s good enough to get us started).

We’re interested in the performance on indicator X both for people who stay put in their countries, and for people with particular (source country, target country) combinations. For instance, we may be interested in asking: how does the (Nepal, India) combination fare on indicator X? Explicitly, that’s asking: how do people who are from Nepal and living in India perform on indicator X?

Mathematical digression: using a matrix representation to store the information

We can use a matrix representation where the rows correspond to source countries and the columns correspond to target countries (both rows and columns should be the same list of countries in the same order for the observations below to hold). The entry in a given cell provides information on indicator X about the collection of people whose source country is the row country and whose target country is the column country.

Let’s explicitly consider the case of three countries. Let’s say country 1 is France, country 2 is Germany, and country 3 is the United Kingdom. The indicator X values for these source and target countries can be codified via a matrix:

$latex \begin{pmatrix} x_{11} & x_{12} & x_{13} \\ x_{21} & x_{22} & x_{23} \\ x_{31} & x_{32} & x_{33} \\\end{pmatrix}$

The nine entries are interpreted as follows:

  • $latex x_{11}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people in country 1 (France) who stay in France.
  • $latex x_{12}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 1 (France) to country 2 (Germany).
  • $latex x_{13}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 1 (France) to country 3 (the UK).
  • $latex x_{21}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 2 (Germany) to country 1 (France).
  • $latex x_{22}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people in country 2 (Germany) who stay in Germany.
  • $latex x_{23}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 2 (Germany) to country 3 (the UK).
  • $latex x_{31}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 3 (the UK) to country 1 (France).
  • $latex x_{32}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people who migrate from country 3 (the UK) to country 2 (Germany).
  • $latex x_{33}$ is the performance on indicator $latex X$ of the people in country 3 (the UK) who stay in the UK.

Note that the entries on the main diagonal (the one from top left to bottom left), namely $latex x_{11}$, $latex x_{22}$, and $latex x_{33}$, correspond to the non-migrants, i.e., the people who stay put in their country. The off-diagonal entries, i.e., the entries $latex x_{ij}, i \ne j$, correspond to migrants. In this case, there are six such entries: $latex x_{12}, x_{13}, x_{21}, x_{23}, x_{31}, x_{32}$.

The three countries in the example above weren’t ordered in any particular way, so there is no significance of an entry being above or below the diagonal. If the countries had been ordered based on some criterion (such as GDP (PPP) per capita), then the entries above and below the diagonal would reflect different types of migration based on whether the sending or receiving country had higher GDP (PPP) per capita.

The simplified example here considers migration between three countries. However, if we want to study migration worldwide, we’d need to include all countries. If there are 200 countries, then we’d have a $latex 200 \times 200$ matrix, with a total of 40,000 entries. In general, if there are $latex n$ countries, the matrix is a $latex n \times n$ matrix with a total of $latex n^2$ entries, of which there are $latex n$ diagonal entries (corresponding to the people who stay put in their respective countries) and $latex n^2 – n = n(n-1)$ off-diagonal entries (corresponding to people who migrate from one country to another). Half of them ($latex n(n – 1)/2$) are above the diagonal. and the other half are below the diagonal, but the above/below distinction is of importance only if the countries are ordered according to some criterion.

Now, there may be cases where migration between two countries is so quantitatively small, or even actually zero, that it’s not meaningful to compute that particular matrix entry. For instance, I think there is zero migration from North Korea to Somalia. So, some entries of the matrix are not defined. This means that we need to be careful if we intend to subject the matrix to techniques of linear algebra. However, we’re using the matrix only to store information, and we don’t perform matrix operations.

End mathematical digression

Totals versus averages

In some cases, we care about the per capita level of an indicator. This is usually the case for indicators such as GDP per capita, crime, or unemployment. In cases where fixed resources are being used up, however, we may care more about the total use. An example may be water use in a country that has a fairly limited water supply. If we’re concerned about total use, then in addition to knowing the per capita value on indicator X for (source country, target country) pairs, we also need to know the size of the population.

The relative size of different populations may matter even if we are concerned only about averages, because we need relative sizes to compute weighted averages.

Weighted averages for residents, naturals, immigrants, and emigrants

In some cases, we are interested not in a particular (source country, target country) combination, but in combining information for all people in a particular source or target country. The following are four typical weighted averages we are interested in. If we are looking at a total of $latex n$ countries, then there are $latex n$ weighted averages of each type (one for each country) and therefore a total of $latex 4n$ weighted averages to consider.

  • The weighted average for all residents of a country, including natives of the country who stay put and migrants from other countries to that country.
  • The weighted average for all naturals of a country, including natives of that country who stay put and people from that country who migrate to other countries.
  • The weighted average for all immigrants to a country, i.e., people who have that as their target country but are from other source countries.
  • The weighted average for all emigrants from a country, i.e., people who have that as their source country but now live in other countries.

Typical forms of comparison

After figuring out how various (source country, target country) combinations, or weighted averages thereof, fare, we can then ask how they compare with one another. Here are some typical questions that can be asked. We’ll use the letter A to denote a hypothetical source country and the letter B to denote a hypothetical target country, but you can replace these with concrete instances (such as France and the United Kingdom):

  1. How do migrants from country A to country B compare with natives of country B (the target country) on indicator X?
  2. How do migrants from country A to country B compare with natives of country A (the source country) on indicator X?
  3. How do migrants to country B compare with resident natives of that country on X?
  4. How do migrants from country A compare with resident natives of that country on X?
  5. How do migrants from country A compare with the natives of the countries they go to on X (combined analysis for all countries they go to)?
  6. How do migrants to country B compare with the natives of their source countries on X (combined analysis for all source countries)?
  7. How do migrants in general compare with non-migrants in general on X?
  8. How do natives of a country receiving migrants compare with natives of a country sending migrants on X? One advantage of this question is that it can be asked without collecting separate statistics on migrants, and can also be asked prior to implementation of migration policies, although the answer might change after implementation of the migration policies.

Mathematical digression: interpretation of the questions in matrix terms

Here is how each of the questions would look like in terms of the matrix representation. For illustrative purposes, we will continue to draw on the three-country setup above with country 1 as France, country 2 as Germany, and country 3 as the United Kingdom.

  1. Compare a matrix entry with the diagonal entry in its column. If we’re interested in studying migration from the UK to France, we compare the entry $latex x_{31}$ (migrants from the UK to France) with the entries $latex x_{11}$ (French natives who stay put).
  2. Compare a matrix entry with the diagonal entry in its row. If we’re interested in studying migration from the UK to France, we compare the entry $latex x_{31}$ (migrants from the UK to France) with the entries $latex x_{33}$ (UK natives who stay put).
  3. Compare the (weighted) average of the off-diagonal entries in a column with the diagonal entry of that column. If we are interested in understanding migration to Germany, we need to compare the entries $latex x_{12}$ and $latex x_{32}$ (migrants from France and the UK to Germany) with $latex x_{22}$ (Germans who stay put). We would usually compute the average of $latex x_{12}$ and $latex x_{32}$ weighted by the respective population sizes.
  4. Compare the (weighted) average of the off-diagonal entries in a row with the diagonal entry of that row. If we are interested in understanding migration from France, we need to compare the entries $latex x_{12}$ and $latex x_{13}$ (migrants from France to Germany and to the UK) with the entry $latex x_{11}$ (French who stay put).
  5. A bunch of pairwise comparisons of the type seen in Question 1 (with pairs in the same column). If we’re interested in figuring out how migrants from France compare with the natives wherever they go. Then, we will compare $latex x_{12}$ with $latex x_{22}$ (comparing French migrants to Germany with Germans who stay put), and separately compare $latex x_{13}$ with $latex x_{33}$ (comparing French migrants to the UK with UK natives who stay put).
  6. A bunch of pairwise comparisons of the type seen in Question 2 (with pairs in the same row). If we’re interested in figuring out how migrants to the UK fare relative to the natives of their source country. Then, we will compare $latex x_{13}$ with $latex x_{11}$ (French who move to the UK versus French who stay put), and separately compare $latex x_{23}$ with $latex x_{22}$ (Germans who move to the UK versus Germans who stay put).
  7. The off-diagonal entries represent migrants, and the diagonal entries represents people who do not migrate. This question therefore involves a comparison of the off-diagonal entries and the diagonal entries.
  8. This compares two diagonal entries. If we’re interested in comparing Germany and the UK, we’ll compare $latex x_{22}$ and $latex x_{33}$.

End mathematical digression

Remarks on selection and treatment effects

We’ll return to this in more depth in part 2, but here are a few preliminary remarks.

The significance of the migration policy regime and other aspects of the scenario (economic policies, economic performance, linguistic differences, etc.) on the indicator matrix is two-fold:

  • A compositional selection effect (for short, we’ll call this a selection effect or a compositional effect) for the groupings, i.e., the choice of the migration policy scenario determines who migrates and who doesn’t, and therefore affects what set of people get included in various (source country, target country) pairs.
  • A treatment effect for the groupings, i.e., some people being able to migrate affects their own performance on indicator X, and also affect the performance on the indicator of others who stay behind in their own countries.

In Part 2, we will look more closely at how to isolate selection and treatment effects when comparing different policy regimes.

Remarks on measurability

For existing policy regimes, the performance on particular indicators of particular (source country, target country) pairs can be computed in principle. Some methods involve complete measurement: for instance, census data that asks people to identify their country of origin, or computerized records of all residents along with their source country. Other methods involve the use of partial data along with sampling techniques to extrapolate to the general population.

Some challenges:

  • In some cases, there is ambiguity, both conceptual and empirical, on the source country of individuals, or on what it means to be a resident (for instance, do we count crimes by tourists?)
  • In some cases, people deliberately conceal or misrepresent information about themselves where the stakes are high. For instance, a foreign-born person may claim to be a native-born when arrested for a misdemeanor, in order to avoid deportation. On the other hand, those who prefer deportation to another country to spending time in prison may misrepresent themselves as foreign-born. People may lie to get access to welfare benefits. False identity documentation may be produced in order to be eligible to work.
  • In some cases, the population involved is so small that the indicator cannot be measured from small samples of the overall population. For instance, there are about 100 people in the US who were born in North Korea. A random sample would probably not pick any of them. Even if it did, statistical averages for the population would not be robust.
  • There are challenges when considering the comparability of indicators across different target countries (and in some cases even within a particular country), because different countries (and different jurisdictions within a country) use different protocols for measurement and have different sources of bias. For instance, the rate of crime reporting may differ considerably between countries, particularly for rape and minor theft. Similarly, when comparing income values, purchasing power parity estimates are not necessarily reliable.

Normative significance of comparisons

The measurements and comparisons here offer only a starting point for investigating the effects of migration: we’d need comparative statics between different regimes in order to tease out the effects of migration. We’ll talk about this more in part 2 and in part 3. But in many cases, our only reliable empirical measurements are the direct ones discussed here, and people often draw conclusions based on this evidence. The following are three typical styles of crude conclusion people draw.

  • Immigrants to country B do better (respectively, worse) on the indicator than natives of country B who stay in their country $latex \implies$ immigration “good” (respectively, “bad”) for country B.
  • Emigrants from country A do better (respectively, worse) on the indicator than natives of country A $latex \implies$ emigration “bad” (cf. brain drain) (respectively, “good”) for country A.
  • Natives of country A worse on the indicator than natives of country B $latex \implies$ Migration from country A to country B good for country A and bad for country B.

Of course, put so bluntly, the claims seem obviously ill-substantiated, and they often break down in practice.

But apart from the need to do more sophisticated counterfactual analysis to actually talk about the effects of migration, there’s another important point: the overall levels of an indicator might matter more than how different groups compare on it. The relative crime rates of natives and migrants are not as important as knowing whether either group has a high crime rate. The relative fertility rates are similarly less important than the overall fertility level. Too much focus on the question of “are immigrants better than natives?” can lead us to ignore other questions of greater moral and practical relevance.

Open borders within India (part 1)

What are some examples of large multilingual zones with internal open borders? The EU (particularly the Schengen area) comes to mind, but it’s relatively recent, and most parts of the EU are quite well-developed. A perhaps more interesting example, particularly for those concerned about the Third World, is internal open borders and intranational migration within India.

I intend to cover India in a series of two blog posts, of which this is the first one. This post (part 1) discusses the size and diversity of India, whether India truly has open borders, relations with nearby countries, secesssionist movements, and overall migration statistics. In part 2, I’ll look more closely at local attitudes to migration, the economic data on migrant performance, as well as episodes with unusually high levels of immigration and emigration for specific regions, usually in the wake of natural or man-made disasters.

Size and diversity of India, compared with Europe and Africa

The population of India is a little over 1.2 billion. Compare this with the population of Europe (about 800 million), Africa (about 1.1 billion), and the European Union (about 500 million).

India is linguistically diverse. Hindi is the most widely used native language in India, and it is the main language of North India, though it comes in many dialects, many of which differ considerably from the version taught in schools. There are an estimated 180 million native speakers of Hindi, or about 15% of India’s total population, though probably a larger percentage of the population (perhaps up to 50%) has a working knowledge of Hindi sufficient for rudimentary oral communication (such as in shops or restaurants). Due to linguistic diversity, English is widely used as a language of official communication within the country, and English fluency is considered a marker of high status, opening access to a wide range of jobs. Wikipedia lists 22 major regional languages in India, each with its own well-developed script and grammar. Some of these languages, including Hindi, have well-developed literatures of their own, and some have movie industries (the biggest of these, Bollywood, is the world’s second largest movie industry after Hollywood, and might well overtake Hollywood on some metrics in the near future). The linguistic diversity of India is in the same ballpark as that of the European Union, which lists 24 official languages and 3 semi-official languages. India and the EU are also similar in that English plays an important role as a language for official communication. While English knowledge of the EU residents as a whole is greater than that of Indians, the most educated Indians probably have comparable English knowledge to the corresponding top slice of EU residents (outside the United Kingdom), because the bulk of higher education in India is in English.

Intranational disparities in income, wealth, and other indicators in India are comparable to those between EU countries, with the most extreme gaps being in the 2-3X range, except for a few very small and highly prosperous states (Sikkim in the case of India, Luxembourg in the case of the European Union). Compare the list of Indian states by GDP and list of European countries by GDP (PPP) per capita. (This post by my co-blogger Hansjoerg Walther might also be of interest). In the European Union, the most prosperous countries are in the northwest (UK, France, Germany) and the Nordic area (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark). In India, Punjab in the north is relatively prosperous due to agriculture, and the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and the southern states are prosperous due to a mix of proximity to sea ports and a relatively more educated and modern population. The poorest states are the north-eastern states, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and others in the central part of India.

I’m not aware of research that attempts to compute place premia within India, but my guess is that they’d be somewhat but not much narrower than the gaps in GDP per capita. In other words, I do think that skill differences account for part of the wage difference, but the huge scale of internal migration (discussed later in this post) suggests that people do see wage gains upon migrating.

It’s more truly open borders than China

The Chinese government has heavily restricted migration in a fairly systematic way for quite some time via the Hukou system, although they seem to be relaxing these controls. In India, the freedom of movement within the country is enshrined in the Constitution of India (see Fundamental Right #2 in the list of fundamental rights), and there are, to the best of my knowledge, no generic de jure or de facto legal barriers to migration. There do exist barriers to effective access to welfare state privileges associated with residency, and access to some government services and privately provided services is hindered due to a lack of knowledge of the regional language (particularly so for people who lack fluency in English and even more so for people who don’t know Hindi either) — more on this later in the post. But as far as the physical act of movement and relocation goes, “open borders” is certainly the right term. It’s not different in any meaningful way from freedom of movement between the member states of the United States.

Border relations with nearby countries

India has open borders with two of its land neighbors, Nepal (more here) and Bhutan. Relations with other neighbors are somewhat more hostile: Pakistan and India have tense relations largely due to disputes over Kashmir. India also shares a border with China, Bangladesh, and Burma (Myanmar) but does not have open borders with any of them. Tibet, which is close to India, has also sent many refugees to India.

India is physically close to Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is a short distance over water from the southern tip of India. Relations with Sri Lanka have been tense and have fluctuated over the years (long story).

Anyway, with the exception of Nepal and Bangladesh, none of the other countries have sent significant numbers of migrants to India, either in absolute terms or as a fraction of their populations, nor have Indians emigrated to these countries in great numbers. So for the most part, India is a closed system with internal open borders but little human interchange with the nearby world. There is emigration to faraway places (skilled emigration to the First World, plus some emigration to the Gulf States and other parts of the world) but a discussion of that gets us too far afield.

Secession movements in India

How has India managed to survive as a single country for so long? That’s a puzzle with perhaps no satisfactory answer. There have been a number of separatist movements. See this Wikipedia page for more information. None of the movements have continued for a very long time, and the grievances expressed in the movements have usually been either suppressed or accommodated through “keyhole solutions” (such as carving out a separate smaller state for the aggrieved parties, allowing for official recognition of their language, etc.). Some of the nationhood demands may well have been ambit claims, though I don’t have enough subject matter knowledge to be definitive.

The main exception is Kashmir, where a non-negligible fraction of the population has been interested in seceding from India for a considerable length of time, some of them desiring independence and others wanting Kashmir to join Pakistan. Pakistan too has had a vested interest in Kashmir. Kashmir’s accession to India was accomplished via the decisions of an unelected ruler and a popular political leader back in 1947, but the decision may not have had strong support on the ground, and Pakistan’s government has had a vested interest in helping foment dissatisfaction against the Indian government.

With the exception of Kashmir and smaller movements in the North-East, secession movements have not been active in India of late. I expect that if India’s economic growth continues apace, popular support for secession will continue to fall, as people prefer access to a wider economy over forming a nation better suited to their ethnic self-concept.

A single state with open borders versus the benefits of many different competing states

I’m somewhat sympathetic to the ideas of federalism and subsidiarity — rather than having a single government catering to a large population, it’s better to have many smaller governments catering to smaller populations. This allows for more experimentation (e.g., Tiebout competition). But, in the world as it stands today, the fragmentation into smaller governments comes at a huge cost: the states inevitably put migration restrictions and trade tariffs, leading to economic inefficiency. Whether the benefits of “letting a thousand nations bloom” outweigh the costs of restricted trade and migration is a difficult question. In the case of India, my guess is that:

  • India’s overall prosperity would be lower (perhaps comparable with Pakistan or Bangladesh, though probably a bit better) if it had split up into multiple nation-states that had peaceful relations but imposed restrictions on trade and migration with each other.
  • There would be more variation between the economic regions of India. I expect that the most prosperous states of India would probably do about as well as the most prosperous states of India do today, but the least prosperous would do considerably worse. It’s possible, though, that politics would have moved somewhat differently, and some states would have done better as independent states. There is more uncertainty at the level of individual states.
  • There would be a higher probability of a few impressive success stories, i.e., countries with income levels similar to Mexico or Malaysia, under a split. But I don’t think any particular region of India could predict with high probability that that particular region would take off as a success story, so in expectation, I still think most regions would be better off staying as part of India.

Of course, in principle, there is no conflict between having separate nation-states and having open borders and free trade, and my intuition is that this might well be optimal, but the option is currently not really on the table. One possible move in that direction, without sacrificing national unity, would be to move towards shifting more responsibilities to the states rather than the central (federal) government. This is unlikely to happen because the manner of separation of duties is specified in the Constitution, and currently heavily favors the central government, even giving it precedence on items that are in a joint list (the Concurrent List).

Migration within India

There is a fair amount of internal migration in India, though the data isn’t of sufficiently high quality to judge how well it fits with economic models. The Migration Policy Institute article titled Internal Labor Migration in India Raises Integration Challenges for Migrants by Rameez Abbas and Divya Varma offers an excellent overview of what’s known, and includes references to other online and offline material on the subject. The following are some highlights:

  • A huge amount of intranational migration is rural-to-urban migration. Unsurprisingly, the states with the most rural populations (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar) are the states that send the most migrants to other states.
  • In general, migration flows seem to go from states with lower per capita income to states with higher per capita income, and the same phenomenon is observed for intra-state migration. But this is closely related to the phenomenon of migration being rural-to-urban.
  • The 2001 census recorded 191 million people who had migrated to a faraway district or different state. This was 20% of the population at the time. About 70% of internal migrants were women, and their main motive for migration was marriage. Males who migrated were largely motivated by economic reasons (looking for jobs). The total proportion of migrants is close to 30% but this also includes people who migrate short distances to nearby places. (This UNICEF report from 2012 also gives the 30% figure).
  • A large fraction of labor migration is short-term migration. The migrants are generally not highly skilled, but it’s unclear how their skill level compares with the population as a whole, given that the Indian population in general is not highly skilled. Most labor migrants are employed in a few key subsectors, including construction, domestic work, textile and brick manufacturing, transportation, mining and quarrying, and agriculture.

The article identifies the following challenges for migrants:

  • Documentation and identity: Migrants often lack appropriate documents to establish their identity and establish residency and therefore have trouble accessing both government-provided and privately provided services.
  • Housing: Migrants typically live in slums in conditions that are often more crowded than where they came from. The informal nature of their housing adds to the challenge of establishing residency necessary for accessing various services.
  • Limited access to formal financial services: We’ll discuss this more in part 2.
  • Political exclusion: We’ll discuss this more in part 2.
  • Rampant exploitation: We’ll discuss this more in part 2.

Stay tuned for part 2, where I’ll look more closely at local attitudes to migration, the economic data on migrant performance, as well as episodes with unusually high levels of immigration and emigration for specific regions, usually in the wake of natural or man-made disasters.

Open Borders Allow People, Not Their Place of Birth, To Control Their Lives

Fabio Rojas has written that to convince the public to support open borders, advocates “need a simple and concise idea that undermines the belief that people from other countries must be forcibly separated from each other. This idea must subtly, but powerfully, undermine the distinctions that make people believe that only citizens have the right to travel and work without impair.”  He suggests that this idea must appeal to “basic moral intuition” and that “lengthier academic arguments,” while persuasive, are ineffective.  I propose the following intuitive, simple message to help convince people to favor open borders: Open borders allow people, not their place of birth, to control their lives.

The content of this message is not original, although the wording may be.  The content is borrowed in part from John Lee,  who has implored, “… let’s not use birth as a reason to deny those less fortunate than us some of the same opportunities you and I had.”  Similarly, R. George Wright of Indiana University has written, in “Federal Immigration Law and the Case for Open Entry,” how those with the “undeserved good fortune to have been born in the United States resist… accommodation of the undeservedly less fortunate.”

There are several reasons why this message may resonate with the public.  First, it refers to “people,” not “immigrants.”  Using Fabio’s language, this “undermines the distinctions” between those in immigrant receiving countries and would-be immigrants by emphasizing the common humanity between both groups.  Second, at least for the American public, its emphasis on “control” taps into commonly held values of individualism and self reliance.  Third, again at least in an American context, the idea that birthplace should not be permitted to negatively impact opportunity connects with the widely accepted notion that people should not be discriminated against based on congenital traits such as gender and skin color.

To humanize the message, examples of people constrained by conditions in their birth country must be provided. An powerful example would be the Dalits, or “untouchables,” of India.  A report   by two Dutch organizations explains the plight of this group:  “The caste system divides people on the basis of birth into unequal and hierarchical social groups. Dominant castes enjoy most rights and least duties, while those at the bottom – the Dalits–in practice have few or no rights. They are considered ‘lesser human beings’, ‘impure’ and ‘polluting’ to other caste groups. Untouchables are often forcibly assigned the most dirty, menial and hazardous jobs, such as cleaning human waste. Caste discrimination is outlawed in India, but implementation of legislation is lacking. It is estimated that in India there are around 200 million Dalits.” (page 9)  A Mother Jones article on abusive conditions for girls who work in garment factories in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu describes the situation in a village where some of girls come from: “Most of the tea workers are from the lower castes and make about $3 per day; it costs a month’s salary just to outfit a child with books and a uniform for school.”

Another example of conditions ruling lives is provided by Luis Alberto Urrea in The Devil’s Highway, which chronicles the suffering of a group of Mexicans who crossed into the U.S. through the Arizona desert in 2001.  Mr. Urrea notes the economic conditions at the time in the state of Veracruz, Mexico, where several of the individuals in the group came from:  “The people were killing themselves working the ranchos on the outskirts.  The fishermen couldn’t catch enough protein in the sea.  The cane cutters couldn’t cut enough cane.  The small peasant farmers couldn’t get good enough prices to cover the costs of planting and harvesting their coffee… Prices kept rising, and all families… were able to afford less and less.  Food was harder to come by: forget about telephones, clothes, cars, furniture.  Even chicken feed… was expensive.  Pampers, milk, baby formula, shoes, tuition, tools, medicine… Between Americanized prices for their frijoles, and the unpredictable spikes in the price of tortillas, the Veracruzanos sometimes didn’t even know how they would feed their families.” (pp. 44-45)

Beyond poor economic conditions, there are also numerous situations to be cited in which people’s lives are controlled by unsafe conditions in their home countries, such as the civil wars in Syria and Central African Republic.  Even without mass conflict, in many countries the average person has little protection from the violent whims of others.  In a recent column entitled “The Republic of Fear,” David Brooks notes that in many countries, especially in the developing word, unless a person is part of a wealthy, powerful elite, he cannot “take a basic level of order for granted.”  Mr. Brooks writes that “People in many parts of the world simply live beyond the apparatus of law and order.” As I have written previously, women especially have little protection from family members or strangers in many parts of the world.

Lack of control over one’s life is especially apparent in parts of the world where people cannot practice their religion, cannot choose what they wear, cannot marry whom they want, or cannot be openly gay.  In western countries that value such freedoms, emphasizing the opportunity open borders would provide individuals to acquire these freedoms should particularly resonate with the public.

The message emphasizing control also must be accompanied by evidence that open borders would not negatively impact the lives of most people in immigrant receiving countries and that there would be mechanisms instituted to compensate those who might experience economic losses from open borders.  (Vipul has summarized these mechanisms.)  The Immigration Policy Center site provides more such evidence, as does this site (Here, here, here, and here).

It is true that no one has total control over their lives.  Even in advanced countries, the family environment in which we were raised, our natural abilities, and our health often determine our options.  The idea in the message Open borders allow people, not their place of birth, to control their lives is to remove place of birth as a limiting factor.

Hopefully advocates will reach a consensus on a simple, powerful message supporting open borders that will resonate with the public.  The message promoted here can be a starting point.