Tag Archives: minimum wage

Pure open borders and keyhole solutions: is the distinction semantically valid?

This post builds on my preceding post not-quite-open borders: keyhole solutions, complementary policies, and blanket restrictions. Although it’s not necessary to read that post first, doing so would provide better context for understanding this post.

The keyhole solutions page on our site dates back to the site’s inception, and discussion and comparison of different keyhole solutions has been an important part of our site and blog since then. The basic idea behind keyhole solutions: for any identifiable problem, try to find a solution that addresses the problem as specifically and narrowly as possible, while not forbidding or restricting other actions. For instance, if the concern is that immigrants’ use of welfare benefits will lead to fiscal bankruptcy, placing and enforcing stronger restrictions on immigrant welfare access would be the keyhole solution that allows migration, preserves the existing welfare state for existing users, and allegedly solves the alleged problem. More at the keyhole solutions page.

My co-blogger Nathan Smith had devised his favorite keyhole solution, Don’t Restrict Immigration, Tax It (DRITI), long before Open Borders: The Case existed.

Does the site advocate keyhole solutions? Not officially, but it’s clear that we give them serious consideration as one of the alternatives to pure open borders as a way of liberalizing migration. In one of the first systematic explorations of the subject, I noted that there are six possible rank-order preferences one might have between “pure” open borders, open borders with keyhole solutions, and the closed borders-ish status quo. For any keyhole solution A, the three options being ranked are:

  1. Open borders without keyhole solution A (that one might loosely call “pure” open borders).
  2. Open borders with keyhole solution A.
  3. Closed borders and/or status quo.

This loose trichotomy (pure open borders, open borders with keyhole solutions, and closed borders) has been loosely endorsed by other bloggers on the site, such as Samuel Wilson in his discussion of moral intuitions and the euvoluntary principle in connection with open borders, myself in my discussion of the permissibility, desirability, feasibility, and stability of keyhole solutions, and Paul Crider in his critique of keyhole solutions. Paul offers a great summary of keyhole solutions before taking them down (which, in the above jargon, means endorsing (1) > (2) > (3) over (2) > (1) > (3)).

Implicit in this discussion is the view that some approaches to a more liberal migration policy are identifiable as (closer to) pure open borders whereas others are identifiable as keyhole regimes. Broadly, this is true, which is why my post, and Paul’s, make eminent sense. And I think that keyhole solutions are an important idea in the lexicon of people thinking about realistic regimes with substantially more liberal migration policies than exist today. However, I think that the distinction between pure open borders regimes and keyhole regimes is quite fuzzy. But first, a little detour.

Keyhole solutions, complementary policies, and blanket restriction

As I discuss at more length in my post not-quite-open borders: keyhole solutions, complementary policies, and blanket restrictions, there are actually three slightly different types of policy adjustments and compromises that often get put in the broad bucket of keyhole solutions:

  1. The first addresses the perceived problem at the intersection of migration status and welfare eligibility. Prima facie, this targets the problem most narrowly and is most deserving of the “keyhole solution” label. I’ll call this type of solution a true keyhole solution.
  2. The second addresses the problem but focuses on the broader issue of welfare use and welfare eligibility. Rather than focusing on migrants per se, it addresses a potential problem that is made more severe due to migration flow, but it addresses it in a way that does not per se discriminate on the basis of migration status. I’ll call this type of solution a complementary policy change.
  3. The third seeks to preserve the status quo as far as possible with respect to domestic policy, and addresses the potentially dangerous interaction with migration by forbidding the forms of migration perceived as risky. I’ll call this type of solution a blanket restriction.

Ceteris is not paribus: some mathematical background

(This section doesn’t strictly require, but can benefit from, broad familiarity with the concept of derivatives and multivariable calculus).

In economics and the social sciences, it is customary to consider questions of the form “ceteris paribus, how does a change in variable x affect variable u?” Here, ceteris paribus is understood to mean “other variables being left unchanged.” The concept of partial derivative is a particular encapsulation of this idea of trying to isolate the effect of one variable on another while holding the remaining variables constant.

Back when I taught multivariable calculus to economics majors, I used to emphasize the important fact that the concept of ceteris paribus is ill-defined, because the choice of “other variables” that you keep constant heavily depends on how you coordinatize the system (you can read more here, and also watch the embedded videos). The “real-world” example discussed on the page is quoted below (and isn’t directly related to migration, but will help illustrate the general line of argument):

Suppose a country’s military spending is determined by just two factors: its per capita GDP and its population. We want to study the relationship between per capita GDP and military spending.

There are two sensible ways (among many) of trying to do this:

  • Study the relationship between per capita GDP and military spending holding population constant. In other words, take the partial derivative with respect to per capita GDP holding population constant. In this case, we are thinking of military spending as a function of the two variables: per capita GDP, and population.
  • Study the relationship between per capita GDP and military spending holding total GDP constant. Prima facie, this is similar to the previous one, because total GDP is just a product of per capita GDP and population. However, what we have done effectively is consider a partial derivative of the function in a new coordinate system, where the two variables of interest are: per capita GDP, and (per capita GDP) times (population).

The point is that the partial derivatives will have different expressions depending on what we hold constant.

Ceteris is not paribus: the problem of distinguishing between “pure” open borders and a compromised solution

In the simplest telling, pure open borders refers to a situation where we “just open the borders” and keep all other policies essentially unchanged. Keyhole solutions (viewed broadly) involve opening the borders but making some changes to policies. These changes could be true keyhole solutions (operating at the intersection of migration and the relevant domestic policy), complementary policy changes (such as changes to general rules for welfare eligibility or changes to the minimum wage), or blanket restrictions on some types of migration.

However, this raises the question: what are those other things that we hold constant? If nothing else, open borders will lead to changes in the size of the population in many countries, and sometimes quite significant changes. What would it mean, for instance, to say that we open the borders without changing any policies or rules related to the welfare state? There are many possible interpretations:

  • The rules for welfare eligibility, and the size of welfare benefits per capita for recipient, remains the same.
  • The total size of the welfare state (i.e., the amount of money allocated to pay for welfare benefits) stays the same, or stays the same relative to the population, or stays the same relative to the size of the economy.
  • The total number of welfare recipients remains the same, or remains the same relative to the population size.

These are all different senses of “staying the same.” In most contexts, these differences don’t matter much (or at least, don’t appear to matter much) because the overall global changes to the relevant quantities aren’t very large. However, if open borders is going to be a big deal, then it likely won’t be possible to hold all of these constant or even close to constant. Once we concede that not all aspects of existing policy regimes can be held constant, the conceptual distinction between pure open borders and keyhole solutions becomes more tenuous. Both “pure open borders” and “keyhole solution”-type policies offer plausible descriptions of a world with more liberal migration that nonetheless preserve or inherit some features from the status quo. Calling one set of policies “pure open borders” is mostly about exercising a value judgment regarding which features are central to and represent the essence of the system.

Similarly, consider minimum wage policies (the minimum wage is a topic that has been discussed extensively in the Open Borders Action Group, and we intend to do blog posts about it). Again, there are many different ways in which we can consider minimum wage levels:

  1. We can think of them as associated with specific currency units, not adjusted for inflation. So a minimum wage of $8/hour remains a minimum wage of $8/hour even if the dollar depreciates significantly in value.
  2. We can think of a minimum wage in terms of the associated consumption basket, i.e., indexed for cost of living.
  3. We can set the minimum wage in relation to median wage levels.
  4. We can set a minimum wage threshold based on the maximum amount of unemployment we are willing to tolerate.

There are arguably many different ways of thinking about the appropriate level of a minimum wage (and whether there should be a minimum wage at all). Our choice of preferred rationale for justifying the status quo will determine what sort of minimum wage regime we’d like to see in an open borders world.

For those who simply think of the minimum wage in terms of a currency unit, little head-scratching needs to be done. For those who associate minimum wages with consumption baskets, median wages, or tolerable levels of unemployment, however, the nature of changes under open borders could be quite different. Migration can change the cost of living structure by making some services cheaper and others more expensive. Thus, cost-of-living calculations could change quite a bit. Median wage levels could change both because the wages of existing residents change and because of compositional effects arising from inclusion of the new migrants. Finally, given differences in the skill level of migrants compared to natives, the minimum wage would probably need to be reduced to maintain a similar unemployment rate to the status quo.

With all that said …

I don’t want to exaggerate how dramatic open borders would be. I think a fairly liberal migration regime is fairly consistent with the nation-state roughly as we know it, and while it might push the world to a “no borders” condition over the long run, that won’t happen in short order. But a lot of the specifics will change, in ways that are somewhat but not entirely predictable, and in some cases not pretty. Thus, the concept of “pure” open borders (“just open the borders and don’t touch anything else”) is not as clear-cut as we might naively presuppose. At the end of the day, a policy implementation has to consider many other existing policies in conjunction with changes to migration levels.

With that said, it is still possible to advocate purely for open borders, without advocating for the concept of pure open borders. When I say “advocate purely for open borders” I mean advocate for change in the direction of open borders, without being picky about the specifics, and being flexible about the selection of specifics based on more detailed context-specific empirical analysis. This might mean advocating for changes that could go in directions you consider more “pure” versions of open borders, or advocating in directions you consider more like keyhole solutions or open borders with complementary policies.

Related reading

In addition to inline links within the blog post, check out:

Not-quite-open borders: keyhole solutions, complementary policies, and blanket restrictions

A naive thinker about open borders might think of it as simply a continuum of possibilities: we can open the borders a bit, or a lot. This distinction is discussed on our moderate versus radical open borders page.

The idea of keyhole solutions has added more dimensions (in a very literal mathematical sense, in addition to the more metaphorical one) to the discussion. Rather than thinking simply of “how much more open should borders be?” the question shifts to “what sort of policy combinations can allow for us to get the most benefit out of migration, in the ways we care about?” The term “keyhole solutions” has come to represent the general idea of exploring a larger space of possibilities with respect to how migration can be expanded.

The purist in me isn’t too happy about this, because “keyhole solutions” as I believe the term originated had a more narrow meaning: to refer to narrow, targeted solutions that address the particular (real, perceived, or predicted) problem at the intersection of migration and whatever other domain is being considered, while trying to interfere as little as possible with the rest of the universe. But meaning is imbued by usage, and I’m okay with the meaning expanding and getting more fuzzy. In this post, however, I discuss some important distinctions between different approaches to “compromise” on open borders policy. There are a few additional subtleties that I’ll deliberately refrain from here, thereby meaning that my post is not reflective on my full thinking on the topic. I’m making that trade-off to keep the post simple.

A simple illustration of the distinction between true keyhole solutions, complementary policies, and (selective) blanket restriction

Consider the (abstract) problem that high levels of migration, along with current de facto rules for the rules for eligibility for welfare benefits, could lead to fiscal bankruptcy. Consider three potential “solutions” (note that these don’t even come close to exhausting the space of possible “solutions” — but they help to illustrate the distinction I’m trying to draw here):

  1. Improve the effectiveness with which immigrants (perhaps limited to the additional immigrants under migration liberalization) are walled off from the welfare state (this could involve changing the rules, or enforcing existing rules more effectively, or a combination).
  2. Reduce welfare benefits across the board for the whole population (see also our contraction of welfare state page).
  3. Forbid the migration of people for whom the probability of welfare benefit use, or the extent of such use (in expectation) exceeds a threshold.

In a loose sense, these are all “keyhole solutions” insofar as they attempt to address the (perceived or predicted) problem of migrant welfare benefit use.

However, they are all different in important ways:

  1. The first addresses the perceived problem at the intersection of migration status and welfare eligibility. Prima facie, this targets the problem most narrowly and is most deserving of the “keyhole solution” label. I’ll call this type of solution a true keyhole solution.
  2. The second addresses the problem but focuses on the broader issue of welfare use and welfare eligibility. Rather than focusing on migrants per se, it addresses a potential problem that is made more severe due to migration flow, but it addresses it in a way that does not per se discriminate on the basis of migration status. I’ll call this type of solution a complementary policy change.
  3. The third seeks to preserve the status quo as far as possible with respect to domestic policy, and addresses the potentially dangerous interaction with migration by forbidding the forms of migration perceived as risky. I’ll call this type of solution a blanket restriction. To emphasize that the blanket restrictions don’t apply to everybody, we might call it selective blanket restriction.

However, from another perspective, (2) and (3) are examples of keyhole solutions, insofar as they directly address problems created by migration. Whatever names you choose, I want to claim that there is an important conceptual distinction. Continue reading “Not-quite-open borders: keyhole solutions, complementary policies, and blanket restrictions” »

Vivek Wadhwa, and the moral contradictions of mainstream liberal views on immigration

Last week, I attended the Intelligence Squared debate on the motion “Let anyone take a job anywhere”, with Open Borders guest blogger Bryan Caplan and tech entrepreneur Vivek Wadhwa speaking for the motion, facing conservative intellectual Ron Unz and migration policy wonk Kathleen Newland in opposition. I’ve already given my take on the debate: Bryan fought the good fight, but Unz and Newland threw up too many blatant inaccuracies and moral contradictions for any single debater to feasibly bat down in the time allotted. I said then that I thought Wadhwa was an ineffective advocate, primarily because he seemed like a moderate open borders supporter who hadn’t thought through things very well. I take that back: Wadhwa was not an effective speaker for the motion, primarily because he is a moderate open borders opponent who hasn’t thought through things very well at all.

I was originally thrown off by Wadhwa’s seeming endorsement of low-skilled migration during the debate: “if an employer thinks that this Mexican gardener is more qualified to do this job than someone else they can hire locally, let them do it.” Sure, Wadhwa endorsed Ron Unz’s proposal for a high minimum wage, even though Unz’s proposal is explicitly intended to bar most immigrants from coming — but paying lip service to the minimum wage is par for the course for any mainstream left liberal. What changed my mind was Wadhwa sending Bryan a harshly-worded missive which accused Bryan of failing the motion because Bryan used “silly analogies”, and failed to demonstrate how the US welfare system would provide for foreigners who come to the US. Wadhwa made it clear: “I do not advocate open borders.”

Bryan republished Wadwha’s missive on EconLog, at his request, and Wadhwa waded into the EconLog comments to defend his views. I give Wadhwa a lot of credit for this. Not many public intellectuals venture into blog comments, let alone get as deeply engaged as he did. However, I found Wadhwa’s elaboration even more disappointing than the seemingly-unwarranted missive he sent Bryan. Wadhwa first stated that he was upset with Bryan because Bryan made the focus of the debate turn on open borders, instead of “jobs”. What exactly Wadhwa intended to debate about “jobs” remains quite unclear to me, but his lack of clarity here explains in hindsight his unfocused opening statement at the debate. In response to his opening statement, Kathleen Newland chided Wadhwa that the motion was “let anyone take a job anywhere”, and not “let anyone take an anywhere job”.

I asked Vivek why exactly he opposes open borders. He’s made it clear that he wants to ban immigrants from coming to the US if they are going to work minimum wage jobs. But what is his alternative then? As I’ve written before, the primary alternative for immigrants and prospective immigrants if they are banned from coming is sweatshop or slave labour, at wages on the order of a few dollars a day, in workplaces where they run the risk of dying daily. If they can find a job here paying $8/hour (the approximate US minimum wage), I say bully for them. The remittances they send home to other poor foreigners already dwarf the foreign aid packages our governments send by 3 to 1. What humanitarian case is there for destroying the global flow of remittances and forcing hundreds of millions to live lives of sweatshop slavery?

When I posed these questions to Wadhwa, he responded:

Why do you assume that the best way of helping poor workers in Bangladesh and other developing countries is to bring them here to the US? Trust me, these people don’t want to leave their families and friends, culture, heritage, and homes to be here. They would rather stay where they are and make a living minimum wage.

It’s a neat story. But I have a hard time squaring this with the fact that immigrants routinely pay thousands or tens of thousands of dollars to be smuggled into the developing world, running the risk of death in the desert or on the high seas. If they are so happy at home, why are they doing these things? And why is it more humane for us to interdict them with gunboats, for the sake of banning them from earning the “inhumane” wage of $8/hour? Is that really the most humane thing we can do? What is inhumane about allowing these people to buy their own plane ticket, pay the government a visa fee or surtax, and come here to work for wages higher than they would ever dream of earning at home?

Mind you, it’s our guns and border fences that force Bangladeshis to choose between backbreaking farm work and murderous sweatshop hours. If you’re going to tell me this is more humane than allowing those Bangladeshis to seek minimum wage work outside Bangladesh, you’d better be prepared to defend it. Even if you think allowing these people a choice won’t actually result in much migration, simply the fact that these workers now have an opportunity to exit will force their employers to pay better wages and improve working conditions. Making some handwavy arguments about brain drain won’t cut it, considering the paucity of evidence of any tangible harms to the developing world from “brain drain”. The burden of proof here is high: you’re asserting that it’s basic humanitarian policy to point a loaded gun at an unarmed human being and force him to turn around, because the alternative of allowing him to go on his merry way in search of a better job is simply too inhumane to tolerate.

Wadhwa at this point departed the comments, but closed on a gracious note, with words of praise for Bryan (albeit, words I find hard to square with his missive, which claimed Bryan’s arguments failed to convince a single person). He also acknowledged that they were likely mismatched partners as a result of a misunderstanding about the motion’s wording. The discussion continued, though, with EconLog commenters trying to make sense of Wadhwa’s position.

It seems quite clear to me now that Wadhwa and Kathleen Newland from the debate are actually kindred spirits. Both believe that it’s inappropriate to permit immigrants entry unless the government guarantees them a social safety net of some kind — and that because it is impossible to extend a single country’s social safety net to every single human being, there must be strict border controls of some kind. Both favour relatively liberal immigration policies, but policies still very far from open borders: they essentially want the status quo, with slightly fewer restrictions.

Wadhwa and Newland seem to be adopting a territorialist view of some kind, whereby a government owes greater obligations to people within its territory, citizens or non-citizens, than it does to people outside its territory. This is why both favour legalising the US’s population of undocumented immigrants and why both believe it’s fatal for open borders to point out that a single government’s welfare system cannot guarantee equal benefits to every single person on earth. There seems to be “local inequality aversion” at play: Wadhwa and Newland feel uncomfortable about admitting more poor people to the US (Wadha calls this “importing poverty”) unless the government can guarantee these poor people socioeconomic uplift.

But moderate territorialism is actually quite compatible with open borders, just like moderate citizenism. During the IQ2 debate, Bryan’s retort to “but they’ll burden our welfare system” was to essentially say: “we can ban them from enrolling in welfare”. This is going to strike most people as too harsh. But more than that, it’s also not really necessary for most developed countries.

The extreme territorialist thinking that pervades mainstream discussions of immigration concludes that the moment we admit a foreigner to our territory, we assume strong moral obligations, especially socioeconomic ones, towards that person. One obligation might be, say, to ensure that every person in our territory is guaranteed a job at a good wage — perhaps one much higher than $8/hour. Now, I’m happy to admit that sure, we assume moral obligations of some kind. (Providing non-citizens the equal protection of our labour laws would be a good start!) But I reject the extreme territorialist view that our obligations to all people in our territory, citizen or not, are identical.

Open borders skeptics say it’s inhumane to allow people to starve in our streets. But we don’t need to see starvation in our streets under open borders: we can simply subsidise the return ticket home for poor foreigners who lose their jobs. Let’s say you reject that as too inhumane. But we don’t need to break the bank still; we don’t need to furnish foreigners with all the same guarantees we make to citizens. We can offer them a basic social safety net: access to some form of healthcare, perhaps unemployment insurance, etc. All these can be guaranteed at levels lower than what we guarantee natives, but levels that still prevent people from dying in our streets.

To put this concretely, government can restrict an immigrant’s access to the state’s retirement funds while still giving the immigrant basic healthcare coverage. Something similar is already the case in the US and most developed countries today. Few, if any, countries give foreigners equal access to their state benefits as they do to citizens — but similarly, few totally deny foreigners access to any benefits. Yet when economists look at the most generous welfare states, even Sweden’s, they find no evidence of the supposed looming fiscal disaster that immigration is supposed to cause. It is perfectly possible to say, as a moderate territorialist-cum-citizenist, that you support open borders with a limited welfare state for non-citizens. Feasibility is not an issue; this is the exact course our governments are already charting capably (though one could argue they could cut foreigners’ access to welfare more). Economists agree that with a limited welfare state, immigrants are not a fiscal burden.

This is not a hamhanded attempt to dismiss the implications of open borders for the welfare state. This is the ultimate implication of the moderate citizenist and moderate territorialist views that most people hold. If the state has to choose who to spend its limited resources on, there is a prima facie case for prioritising citizens. Newland breezily dismissed the claim that immigration restrictions are unjust discrimination against foreigners at IQ2 by saying: “I think our governments are obliged to discriminate in our favour.”

I completely disagree: if anything, governments are obliged to enforce labour and contract laws equally, without regard for national origin! What I am happy to say is that governments are obliged to discriminate in citizens’ favour when it comes to the social safety net. It seems absurd to me to take the stand Wadhwa and Newland have staked out: that it is just and moral to discriminate against foreigners in labour law, but completely unethical to discriminate against foreigners in the social safety net.

But this absurdity may yet be reconcilable, if you stretch territorialism and citizenism to their extremes. The flipside of territorialism and citizenism is that if someone is not currently in our territory, and not a fellow citizen, then they aren’t our problem. Sure, some bricklayer might be dying of cholera in Haiti right now — but that’s not my problem. I don’t live in Haiti, and he doesn’t live in my country. It’d be my problem if I lived in Haiti and elected the Haitian government — or if he lived in my country, subject to the administration of the government I elect. But otherwise, that Haitian’s poverty isn’t my problem, and he should bugger off.

As a result, the perverse conclusions that Wadhwa and Newland seem to endorse — that it is better to prevent the entry of an immigrant if we can’t afford to give him the same healthcare subsidies as a citizen — can actually make eminent sense. It’s not inhumane to use your guns and tanks to keep a poor person trapped in Haiti. You’re just preventing the Haitian government from “exporting poverty”. You’re preventing them from dumping their problems of poverty and squalor into your government’s lap. It’s not your problem; it’s Haiti’s problem!

But this completely denies the agency of individual migrants. No government forces these people to leave Haiti, or wherever they came from. The Haitian government can barely keep the lights turned on! They certainly don’t have the capacity to subsidise emigration or to brainwash their citizens into leaving, or to force their own people at gunpoint into boats headed for the US. And even if they did, so what? That is exactly what Cuba and Vietnam did to their own people, and the free world welcomed these people with open arms. In fact, that is what the US still does today for Cubans — allowing the Castro regime to dump the people it doesn’t want in the US’s lap.

That you have to jump through so many intellectual hoops to morally justify forcing people at gunpoint to turn away from your shores, on the basis that it’s inappropriate for them to work for the wage of $8/hour, suggests something is wrong with your thinking. These people spend thousands of dollars and risk their own lives in deserts or on the high seas to get those $8/hour jobs. That indicates strongly that what they’re fleeing is even more of a bum deal than minimum wage — perhaps, say, a sweatshop, or worse. How can anyone conclude that it is more humane to force these people at gunpoint to go back to a life — and quite possibly death — toiling away for cents an hour in a sweatshop somewhere, than it is to permit them to come in peace in search of minimum wage $8/hour jobs?

When our taxpayer-hired guns force unarmed civilians seeking work to turn back and go home, we make their poverty our problem as well. When they were suffering in Haiti, or Bangladesh, or wherever they came from, their troubles were of no consequence to us. We did not put them in the plight they faced, nor did we hinder them from uplifting themselves. But when they sought work from an employer willing to pay them a wage multiples of what they might ever hope to earn at home, we put our guns in the way. If we’re going to stop them from solving their own problem, we’d better damn well have a better solution to offer them. Nobody asked us to interfere with their job search; we took it upon ourselves to do this. It’s our duty to figure out what to do with these people now.

Now, Wadhwa and Newland believe quite strongly that a high minimum wage and greater foreign aid (or some other mechanism of “exporting prosperity”, as Wadhwa puts it) is the more humane thing to do. Wadhwa seems to think enforcing a “living minimum wage” in the developing world would slow immigration to a trickle. Supposedly this is the liberal solution to the conundrum of immigration; this is the fulfillment of the developed world’s responsibilities to the developing world citizens whom it has arbitrarily banned from its labour markets.

But are a high minimum wage, high levels of foreign aid, and government-enforced social justice in the developing world realistic options? How would we ever find the money to spend on the vast amounts of foreign aid that would be necessary to “level” the world economically, as Newland put it at the debate? How would the governments of the developing world build the capacity to enforce just labour laws — to say nothing of the capacity needed to enforce a high minimum wage? The answer is clear: Newland herself said at the IQ2 debate that there is no apparent way we can accomplish such “leveling”. So what’s the next least inhumane alternative?

Economist and mainstream liberal Paul Krugman once wrote a seminal essay justifying the toleration of sweatshops as the least inhumane thing we can do for the world’s poor. I excerpted Krugman for my piece on how open borders would abolish Bangladeshi sweatshops. His logic holds true as ever — but it really applies to immigration, not sweatshops:

You may say that the wretched of the earth should not be forced to serve as hewers of wood, drawers of water, and sewers of sneakers for the affluent. But what is the alternative? Should they be helped with foreign aid? Maybe–although the historical record of regions like southern Italy suggests that such aid has a tendency to promote perpetual dependence. Anyway, there isn’t the slightest prospect of significant aid materializing. Should their own governments provide more social justice? Of course–but they won’t, or at least not because we tell them to. And as long as you have no realistic alternative to industrialization based on low wages, to oppose it means that you are willing to deny desperately poor people the best chance they have of progress for the sake of what amounts to an aesthetic standard–that is, the fact that you don’t like the idea of workers being paid a pittance to supply rich Westerners with fashion items.

In short, my correspondents are not entitled to their self-righteousness. They have not thought the matter through. And when the hopes of hundreds of millions are at stake, thinking things through is not just good intellectual practice. It is a moral duty. (emphasis added)

I hope Wadhwa and Newland, and all the liberals who share their views, will do their moral duty, and think things through.

The photograph of Vivek Wadhwa used in the header of this post was taken by John P. Harvey and is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike licence.